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The New Deal was not inspired by an ideology. It was a series of
measures undertaken by the Roosevelt Administration from 1933 to 1939
to combat the Great Depression and bring about recovery. Some of the
measures were started by Hoover and were continued, on a larger scale,
by Roosevelt.
The New Deal was only a partial success in increasing employment. In
1933 when World War II broke out, there were still 8.8 million persons un¬
employed. However, it marked the beginning of a new era. In the first place,
the Administration emphasized the responsibility of the federal government
for social well-being. Secondly, it adopted some policies which were a con¬
tradiction of some of the concepts of orthodox economics. Finally, it em¬
braced the principle of giving economic aid and legal bargaining rights to
groups v\^ich were most adversely affected by the depression.
It is the purpose of this thesis to survey and analyze the monetary and
fiscal policies of the New Deal. These were the most important parts of the
New Deal program. Measures in other fields of the New Deal were directly or
indirectly related to them.
In the early years of the New Deal, especially before 1935, emphasis was
placed on monetary policy. The objective was to induce recovery by cheapen¬
ing money and raising prices. Money was to be made cheap through the Federal
Reserve System. Commodity prices were to be increased by raising the price
of gold or devaluation of the gold dollar. It was believed that these measures
alone were sufficient to induce expansion and bring about recovery. But when
these measures failed, emphasis was soon shifted to fiscal policy.
.V
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After 1935» the New Deal Administration was preoccupied with fiscal
policy as the major means to recoveryi although easy money policy was
continued throughout. The puxpose of the fiscal policy of the New Deal
was to increase purchasing power by government deficit spending. The
spending program was divided into two periodst (1) punp priming and (2)
compensatory spending. It was based on Keynes's theory that additional
deficit spending by the government would increase purchasing power by an
amount much larger than the original expenditure. A public works program
was started for public expenditure. It was continued throughout the 1930*$.
Deficit spending by the New Deal Administration did increase the
national income, but it did not solve the whole problem of unemployment.
It was argued that the deficit spending was not adequate. It was only
after the outbreak of World War II in 1939 that the problem of unesf>loyment
was fully solved and the nation was lifted out of the Great Depression.
Chapter I is a review of the background of the New Deal. In chapters
II'IV, monetary policy is discussed. Chapters V-VII are devoted to fiscal
policy. Some ideas for future policy are expressed in chapter VIII.
CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND OF THE NEW DEAL
I. The Golden Twenties (1922-1929)
After World War ly the United States experienced a short-period boom,
from 1919 to 1920. Industries encouraged by the war were sustained by
civilian demand for consunption and investment puzposes* National income,
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at 1929 prices, rose from $57.0 billion in 1919 to $58*4 billion in 1910«
The contribution of manufacturing te national income rose from $16*2 billion
in 1919 to $19*8 in 1920. However, the boom did not last long* It came to
an end early in the summer of 1920. Wholesale prices fell frem a hi^ of
167 in May, 1920, to a low of 91 in January, 1922 (1926 s 100). National
income at 1929 prices, fell from $58*4 billion in 1920 to $66.5 billion in
1921. The postponed reaction to wartime conditions had set in.
However, the economy recovered quickly from the post-war recession of
1920-21. There was a ctmiulative improvement in business conditions up to
1929. The Federal Reserve index of industrial production increased steadily
from 58 in 1921 to 110 in 1929 (1935 - 39 = 100), National income, at 1929
prices, rose steadily from $56.5 billion in 1921 to $87.1 in 1929. The
rapid expansion of the motor-vehicle industry, which stimulated production
in the steel and other related industries, was the main cause of the im~
provement. There was also a building boom, the volume of vdtich rose from
$2 billion in 1921 to $4.3 billion in 1926 and stood at $4.1 billion from
1927 to 1929.
_
Simon Kuznets, National Income and Its Composition* 1919-1938 (New
York* National Bureau of Economic Research, i94l), vel* I, p. 269.
1
2
As business improved» corporations continued to expand, and hundreds
of thousands of stocks, bonds, and miscellaneous securities were floated.
Many were sold on the New York Stock Market. The stimulus of quick profits
led to a boom of speculation. In the single year 1929, no less than $11
billion of new securities were marketed.
There was very unsound speculation in stocks. It was explained as
1
speculation due to "specifically American mass psychology." The easy-money
policy of the Federal Reserve System was also responsible for the rise in
speculation on the stock market. Rediscount rates were reduced from 4^ te
3^ at all the Reserve Banks in 1927. Low money rates, it was thought,
would make it cheaper for Europe to borrow in this country and purchase
American agricultural products. Furthermore, since there was a large inflow
ef gold from Europe into the United States, easy money was expected te curb
the flow and preserve the gold standard in Europe. Speculation became
frantic in 1929. Borrowing for speculation on the New York Stock Market
rose from $3.3 billion in September, 1927, to $8.5 billion in September,
1929. Prices on the exchange rose 80^ between the spring of 1925 and the
close of 1927, another 25^ in 1928, and 35^ more by the end of September,
1929. Flotations of new stock issues rose to unprecedented heights.
II. The Great Crash and the Great Depression
A catastrophic crash occurred in October, 1929. It was partially
triggered by the British, who raised their interest rates in an effort to
induce return of capital vdiich had been lured abroad by investors in the
i
J. A. Schumpeter, "The Decade of the Twenties," American Economic
Review: Supplement. May, 1946, p. 9.
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United States* Foreign investors and domestic speculators began to sell
their stocks, and an orgy of desperate selling followed. Records for
high rates of selling were made in October. More than 6 million shares
were sold on the New York Stock Exchange on the 23rd, 13 million on the
24th, and 16.5 million on the 29th* In a few weeks of "the greatest
stock market catastrophe of all the ages," some $30 billion in supposed
1
values disappeared. According to the New York Times index of 50 stocks
(25 industrials and 25 railroads) the average price fell from 300.52 to
58.65 per share.
The Great Qrash was the beginning of the Great Depression which lasted
ten years. It was the most prolonged and devasting in the United States
or world experience. Virtually every branch of economic activity deterio¬
rated rapidly* National income, at 1929 prices, drc^ped from $87*1 billion
in 1929 to $55.6 billion in 1932 and to $56.7 billion in 1933. The contri¬
bution of agriculture to national income dropped from $7.7 billion in 1929
to $2.8 billion in 1932. The contribution of manufacturing fell from
$19*8 billion in 1929 to $6.3 billion in 1932, less than one-third of its
1929 value. The value of construction dripped from $4.1 billion in 1929
2
to $1.1 billion in 1932 and to $0.7 billion in 1933. Unenf>loyment rose
at a rapid rate, from 1.5 million in 1929 to 11*9 million in 1932 and 12.6
million in 1933, which was about one fourth of the labor force*
J. A. Schuirpeter wrote that the immediate causes of the Great Depression
were the speculative mania of 1927-29, the weakness of the United States
1
B, Mitchell, Depression Decadet From New Era Through New Deal. 1929-
1941 (New Yorks Rinehart & Co., 1947), p. 27.
2
Kuznets, op. cit.. p. 163.
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banking system, and the heavy burden of mortgage debt* But the underlying
economic conditions themselves were condictive te a downswing in business
activity. The dislocations caused by World War I still remained in large
part and even in the high prosperity of the twenties, farm prices remained
low and agriculture failed te achieve a substantial recovery from the cir¬
cumstances of World War I* The ratio of farm prices to costs was 109^ in
1919* It declined to 75^ in 1921 and continued to be low throughout the
2
I920*s and 1930*s* Even without the Crash in 1929, the high rate of in¬
vestment in construction and in the production of durable goods in the
twenties would have caused market saturation and a business recession*
We are to think also of international causes* The economic anemia and
the financial collapse in Europe and the decline in international trade,
3
vdiich was accelerated by the short-sighted Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930,
also aggravated the depression* Other underlying factors that weakened the
ability of the economy to withstand adverse change could have been the rapid
rates of technological change and increasing rigidities of some prices*
The depression reached a crucial point when, in 1933, a banking crisis
occurred throughout the country because of bank failures* The Roosevelt
Administration rescued the banking system by a series of emergency measures,




F. A. Shannon, America*s Economic Growth (3rd ed*; New York* Macmillan
Co., 1954), p* 721*
3
The Hawley-Smoot Tariff of 1930 increased the high rates of the Fordney-
McCunber tariff of 1922, largely because of a continued agricultural depres¬
sion* In retaliation, Canada raised her duties on imports from the United
States and fixed quotas on American imports*
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and it was only after the outbreak of World War II that the economy re¬
covered from the Great Depression and the problem of unenployment was
wolved*
III. Hoover and the Depression
No doubt President Hoo\er was disturbed by the depression. But as he
was convinced that industry and self-reliance were the virtues that had made
the United States a great industrial country, he refrained from direct
government action. He believed that business could and should help itself.
But as the depression deepened and the economy showed no signe of re¬
covery, he at length conceded that the unemployed should be given help, but
he Insisted that sudi aid should come from local governments. But the de¬
pression grew steadily worse, and relief by local government agencies proved
to be inadequate. He was finally forced to work out a coxq^romise between
the old hands-off policy and the direct dole then being used in England.
He ad^ted some measures idiich paved the way for some of the later New Deal
policies.
The most important step that Hoover took to combat the Depression was
the establishment of the Reconstruction Finance Cbzporation (RFC) in 1932.
With an initial working capital of $322 million, this agency became a
1
government lending bank. It was specifically organized to provide indirect
relief by loans to insurance companies, banks, agricultural organizations,
railroads, etc., in the hope that if they could be induced to function
_
The aggregate of loans and other authorizations of the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation from February 2, 1932, to December 31, 1939, inclusive,
totalled $13.4 billioni the amount of disbursements, $10.4 billion. It was
liquidated by the RFC Liquidation Act, July 30, 1953.
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normally again, unenployment would be relieved.
There was also an important public works program. Hoover secured from
Congress appropriations totaling $2.25 billion for public projects. The
most significant of th«n was the Hoover Dam on the upper Colorado River.
It was started in 1930 and completed in 1936. It was a huge man-made lake
for purposes of irrigation, flood control, and electric power.
At the close of the fiscal year, June 30, 1932, the gross public debt
1
was $19.5 billion as against $16.8 billion in 1931. The greatest single
cause of deficit was a decrease in receipts. Total receipts for the fiscal
year 1932 were only $2 billion as against $3.2 billion in 1931 and $4.2 bil¬
lion in 1930. The increase in expenditures was smaller than the decrease
in receipts. Expenditures were $4.9 billion for 1932 as compared with
2
$4.1 billion in 1931 and $3.9 billion in 1930.
Thus Hoover inaugurated a significant new anti-depression policy of
dynamic government action. Some of his measures were continued by Roosevelt,
but Hoover's program was inadequate and was started too late. Banks were
greatly weakened by losses in resources and deposits by the spring of 1932
and began to fail rapidly in the sunmer and the fall. By March, 1933, the
entire banking system came to a standstill, not because all banks weire un¬
sound, but to avert a panic whidi would spread from the weak banks through¬
out the closely connected system.
1
Statistical Abstract of the United States (Washington: Government




IV. The New Deal
It was against this background that Franklin D. Roosevelt, in the cam¬
paign of 1932, proposed the "New Deal" as the only hope of recovery from
the depression. Banks were failing by the hundreds. The unemployed numbered
more than 11 million. Mortgages on farms and homes were being foreclosed.
National, state and local taxes were taking one dollar out of every three ef
national income and the public debt was increasing at the rate of $2 billion
a year. Roosevelt toured the country attacking the Hoover /^ministration
and promising economy, a balanced budget, relief for the farmers and re¬
habilitation ef business. The verdict at the polls on November 8 was a
Democratic landslide. It indicated an irresistible demand for a changes »
new deal, if not the New Deal. Any outstanding Democratic candidate proba¬
bly could have won.
Especially serious was the banking situation. Suspensions of payments
by banks rose from 642 in 1929 to 2,298 in 1931 and 1,466 in 1932. On
February 14, the banks of Michigan were closed by proclamation of the Governor
for the "safeguarding ... of the ri^^ts of all depositors." Steadily the bank
moratorium spread from state to state until on March 4, the inauguration day
for President Roosevelt, the banking system of the country was at a standstill.
In the inauguration speech, Roosevelt gave the American pec^le new hope by
assuring them that "the only thing we have to fear is fear itself." He defied
the money diangers "who have fled from their high seats in the ten^le of our
1
civilization." On March 5, the President, by virtue of the authority vested
in him by the war time Act of August 6, 1917, ordered all banks to remain
i
F. D. Roosevelt, The Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D.
Roosevelt (New Yorki Ransom House, 1938), vel. II, pp. 11-12.
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closed from March 6 to March 9* At the same time he summoned Congress to
meet in a special session, on March 9. He soon launched his New Deal pro¬
gram and the Democratic Congress, in response to his proposals, passed a
series of laws dealing with the banking crisis, the agricultural crisis,
and relief.
The principal objectives of Roosevelt's New Deal program were relief,
recovery, and reform. The short-range goals were relief and immediate re¬
covery, especially in the first two years. The long-range goals were perma¬
nent recovery and reforms. The latter were embodied in the Securities
Exchange Acts (1933, 1934), the Glass-Steagall Banking Act (1933), the Public
Utility Holding Company Act (1935), the Fair Labor Standards Act (1938), and
the Wagner Act (1935), Recovery was to be accomplished by the Emergency
Banking Act (1933), National Industrial Recovery Act (1933), Civil Works
Administration (1933), and the Gold Reserve Act (1934), while the purpose
of relief was to be seized by the Unemployment Relief Act (1933), Agricultural
Adjustment Act (1933). National Housing Act (1934), Works Progress Administra¬
tion (1935).
The three-front movement to the new objectives often overlapped and all
these laws shared the common aim of building up purchasing power and living
standards in addition to the particular objective for which each was written.
The United States was to be made more productive, largely through private en¬
terprise, but with such government aid as the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA),
and the country as a whole was to share in increased productivity. As Secre¬
tary Perkins said, "For him (Roosevelt), the economic and political measures
were not the end but the means ... What he cared about was improvement in
9
people's lives. If economic changes were necessary, he would make them,
1
but only to do a specific task,”
1
Frances Perkins, The Roose\elt I Know (New Yorki The Viking Press,
1946), p. 332.
CHAPTER II
BANKING REFORM AND EASY MONEY
The main purpose of the monetary policy of the New Deal were to cheapen
money and raise prices. Money was to be made cheap mainly through the
Federal Reserve System. It was believed that easy money would encourage
businessmen to increase borrowing for investment. This would have an ex*
pansionary effect on the economy since businessmen would then increase out*
put and employment. Commodity prices were to be increased by raising the
price of gold or devaluation ef the gold dollar. It was believed that idien
the price of gold was raised» conmedity prices would rise propertionately»
and that a restoration ef the price level of 1926 would bring about the pros¬
perity of that year. The objectives were to provide relief and bring about
recovery. The first is to be discussed in this chapter while the second is
reserved for the next chapter. In chapter IV they will be summed up te pro¬
vide a wider perspectivs.
I. Banking Reforms
Easy money policy was pursued by the Federal Reserve System vdien the
crash occurred and the depression began in the fall of 1929. The Federal
Reserve purchased government securities and lowered rediscount rates in an
attempt to encourage borrowing. By Junei 1931y the New York Reserve Bank
had cut its rediscount rate to l-^» and other Reserve Banks* rates ranged
from 2 to 3^. However, the volume of Reserve credit outstanding declined
from $1.6 billion late in 1929 to less than $950 million during the first
half of 1931.
The easy money policy of ^en market purchases and low rediscount rates
10
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was to be continued by the Reserve System throughout the Roesevelt Admin*
istration* However^ with the banking system of the country at a standstill
in March» 1933» it was impossible for the Administration and the Federal
Reserve System te pursue successfully any monetary policy. No monetary
measures could be effective when people had lost confidence in the banking
system. Therefore, the first thing for Roosevelt to do was te restore con¬
fidence in the banking system by emergency measures. He had to strengthen
the system by banking reforms. It was only vdien the banking system was
functioning normally that the credit and money of the nation could be regu¬
lated effectively.
1. Emergency Banking Act of 1933
The emergency measure taken by Roosevelt, after the closing of all
banks in the country, was the passage of the Emergency Banking Act. The
Act was passed by Congress on March 9, 1933. It gave power to the President
to control the siq^ply of gold by prohibiting export, heai^ing, and melting,
and it authorized him to call in geld coin, bullion, and certificates to
the Reserve Banks or the Treasury. The law authorized the President te
control the banks in an Msergency and to close some of them, if necessary.
It provided that banks closed by the proclamation of the President, which
were not found to be solvent and eligible te be reopened, were te be placed
in the hands of conservators who were to have charge of the assets for
liquidation or reorganization. The law provided for the purchase of pre¬
ferred stock in banks by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, or accep¬
tance of collateral of similar value from state banks idiich were net au¬
thorized te issue preferred stock. State banks which were not members of
the Federal Reserve System were authorized, with the approval of the state
12
banking authorltias» to borrow money from the Reaerve Banka for a period
of one year*
After the paaaage of the Act, the Preaident immediately ordered the
Secretary of the Treaaury to licenae aolvent banka of the Federal Reaervi
Syatem to reaume operation* State authoritiea were requeeted to do the
aame for atate banka* The reopening of banka went on ateadily from March
12, and by April 1 more than three**fourtha of the country'a 18,000 banka
had been reopened* The Reconatruction Finance Corporation played an im¬
portant part in furnishing the neceaaary reaervea* It advanced funda to
the banka afiich were cloaed and inveated in their preferred atocka and
debenturea* Total loana by the RFC to the banka and inveatmenta in them
had reached nearly $3 billion by the end of 1935* The possibility of secur¬
ing funds from the RFC, no doubt, restored the confidence of the people in
the banks, and facilitated the reopening of them*
2* The Banking Act of 1933
On June 16, 1933, Congress passed the Banking Act of 1933 to remedy the
main defects of the banking system as disclosed by the experience of the
panic and depreasion years* This Act introduced fundamental reforms in the
banking system* It provided for a stricker regulation of the banka by the
Federal Reserve Board and the Comptroller of the Currency* It prohibited
banks from engaging in speculation* It created the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation which insured individual deposits up to $5,000* It required sep¬
aration within one year of all financial affiliates from commercial banks*
To prevent bank competition to get deposits, the Act prohibited member banks
from paying interest on demand deposits* In order to force state banks into
the Reserve System and strengthen banks, national banks were authorized to
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engage in 8tate>wide brandi*banking. The Federal Reserve Board was given
power to detennine the policy^ and to coordinate and regulate the open-
aarket operations of Reserve Banks.
3. The Banking Act of 1935
In the two years following the passage of the Banking Act of 1933 the
Administration was trying to centralize authority over the banks in the
Federal Reserve Board, and bring the Beard more closely under administrative
control. This led to the Banking Act of 1933 which made even greater
changes in the banking system.
The Banking Act of 1935 was described in the Federal Reserve Bulletin
as "the most fundamental revision of the Federal Reserve Act since its
1
adoption 22 years ago in 1913.*' It gave the Federal Reserve Board powers
which had previously been diffused — those over open-market operations,
rediscount rates, and reserve requirements. Mandatory authority ever re¬
discount rates was now given to the Board. Reserve Banks were to submit
their proposed rates to the Beard every fortni^t for approval. Previously,
changes in reserve requirements of member banks could be made only in emer¬
gency and arith approval of the President of the United States, but new the
Board was enpowered to increase reserve requirements up to 100^. Formerly
the epen Market Cmnittee of the System was named entirely by the Reserve
Banks and was merely advisory te the Board. No Reserve Bank was obliged te
participate in the purchase and sale of securities. Now the Beard was given
majority control of the crnimittee, and the Reserve Banks were compelled te
accept its authority.
_
Federal Reserve Bulletin. Sep. 1935, p. 559.
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The power ef member banks to borrow from Reserve Banks was greatly
liberalized* The Board was enpowered to approve loans on assets not of
the old highly liquid character* Also national banks might lend on real
estate up to 60^ of its value for ten years* and all member banks might
invest in real estate up to the total ef their capital and surplus or vp
to 60^ of their savings deposits* whichever was greater* This was a change
of great significance since it was easier now for member banks to partici¬
pate in the financing of building activity* the resumption ef which was an
essential factor in recovery*
Thus* while the 1933 law "worked reform into the privately-owned
Federal Reserve System* giving it strong powers to control banking operations*"
the 1935 Act "worked Government deeper into the Federal Reserve System* making
it a joint controller with the private bankers **• and greatly enlarged the
1
powers the System could exercise*" Thus the Banking Act of 1935 embodied
new facilities for federal government control ef the country's economy through
the Federal Reserve Systmn*
II. Federal Reserve Measures
The emergency measures of the New Deal had been successful in restoring
confidence in the banking system and in saving it from total collapse* The
reforms ef the Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 strengthened the banking system
and thus reduced further the rate of bank failures. From 1921 to 1929 there
were 5*714 bank failures* Between 1929 and 1933 the number increased to
9*106* But from 1934 to 1940 there were only 313 bank failures* Thus* the
banking reforms provided the New Deal with a healthy system* wAiich was
f
C, A. Beard & G, Smith* The Old Deal and the New (New Yorkt Macmillan
Co., 1940)* p. 92-93*
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necessary for effective monetary policy* The Federal Reser\e Board, with
the major credit powers at its disposal, was able to regulate more offee*
tively the credit of the country*
The first measure that the Federal Reserve System took to achieve the
objective ef easy money was open market operations* It was believed that
purchases of government securities in the open market would give member
banks additional reserves, and encourage more lending. Bank deposits would
be increased whenever the checks paid by the System for the securities
bought were deposited with the banks* When diecks were sent to the Reserve
Bank for collection, the sending Banks' reserve accounts were increased by
the same amount. There would be excess reserves, making possible further
credit expansion* Also, the excess reserves would be an inducement to banks
te lower their interest rates, and this weuld encourage borrowing*
During 1933 the Reser\e Banks purdiased $580 million of government se*
curities* This had the immediate effect of increasing member banks* nserves*
At the end of 1933 member banks* excess reserves reached $765 million*
Open market purchases were continued throu^out the latter part of the
New Deal* They were intended partly to increase member banks' reserves and
partly te support government security prices* As we shall see later, the
Administration was te be engaged in deficit financing by issuing securities
and selling them in the open market* To prevent their price from falling,
the Reserve System frecjuently engaged in open market purchases whenever the
market was weak* For exanple, in the recession of 1937, prices in the stock
market fell 40^ from March te November. Government securities also declined
in price* To counteract the decline in government security prices, the
System again engaged in ^en market purchases, in November* In the latter
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part of August, 1939, offering of government securities were finding few
buyers, and prices began to fall. Therefore, the System purchased about
$400 million in the open market in the two weeks ending September 13, "with
a view to preventing the devslopment of disorderly conditions or unreasonably
abrupt decline in prices.” The holdings of the government securities by the
System totalled $2,484 million at the end of 1939 as against $446 million at
the end of 1929, an increase of more than five times.
The second measure that the System took to make easy money available was
to lower the redisceunt rates. By reducing the rediscount rate, the Reserve
Banks could make it lees expensive for member banks to get additional re*
serves by rediscounting commercial paper or by borrowing on their own notes.
This in turn tended to lower the rates member banks diarged their customers,
thus inducing more borrowing.
Throughout the depression years, the Federal Reserve continued to reduce
the rediscount rates. The rediscount rate of the New Yerk Reserve Bank was
cut in October, 1933, from 2^ to 2^. It was lowered to in February,
1934. In August, 1937, it was further reduced to 1^, the lowest central
bank rate in history. The rediscount rates at other Reserve Banks ranged
from 2^ to 3^^ in 1933. They were reduced to 2% by May, 1935, and to
by September, 1937. In September, 1939, they were 1^ at six Reserve Banks
and at the other five.
Throughout the 1930*8, however, the volume of bills rediscounted at the
Reserve Banks continued to decline. As Table 1 shows, it was $803 million
at the end of 1929, and declined to $98 million at the end of 1933. Then it
dropped to $7 million in 1934 and reached the lowest level of $3 million in
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1929 S03- 1936 3
1933 98 1937 10
1934 7 1938 4
1935 5 1939 7
*
Average of daily figures.
Sources Computed from Federal Reserva Bulletin for the years stated*
The failure of a low rediscount rate to induce discounts was due to the
fundamental limit of the rediscount rate itself* It is only when member
banks have to rediscount commercial paper or borrow from the Reserve Banks
that a low rediscount rate can be effective* When we look at the pertfolies
of the member banks during the 1930*Sy it immediately becomes clear that it
was largely due to the existence of large excess reserves that the volume
of bills rediscounted at the Reserve Banks continued to decline* in spite
of low discount rates. As Table 2 shows* member banks had been steadily
accumulating excess reserves. The excess reserves amounted to $765 million
at the end of 1933* rose to $1*747 million at the end of 1934* and reached a
peak of $5*209 on December 31* 1939. It was the accumulation of large ex¬
cess reserves of member banks which caused the System to be unable to in¬
fluence these banks* Interest rates by making dianges in rediscount rates.
However* there was still another factor vdiich weakened the influence ef
the Systmn over member banks. Even if there were no excess reserves* the
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growth of large government security holdings by member banks in the 1930*s
would have rendered the instrument ef the rediscount rate ineffective* As
TABLE 2
EXCESS RESERVES AND HOLDINGS OF GOVERNMEKT
SECURITIES OF ALL MEMBER BANKS, 1929-1939
End-ef-vear figures million ef dollarsI
Excess Government Excess Government
Year Reserves' Securities Year Reserves Securities
1929 n.a. 3,863 1936 1,984 13,545
1933 765 6,887 1937 1,212 12,371
1934 1,747 10,895 1938 3,205 13,222
1935 2,844 12,269 1939 5,209 13,777*
«
June 30 figures.
Source) Excess Reserves* Federal Reserve Bulletin for the years stated.
Government securities* Computed from Federal Reserve Bulletin.
Dec., 1939, p. 1106. Include direct and guaranteed govern¬
ment obligations.
Table 2 shows, all member banks held $3,863 million of govemnent securities
at the end of 1929. The holdings rose te $6,887 million in 1933, $10,895
million in 1934, and thereafter steadily increased until at the end of 1939
they were $13,777 million. Thus when member banks intended to adjust their
reserve position, even if there were no excess resesrves, they could buy and
sell securities instead of borrowing or rediscounting commercial paper.
III. Failure of Easy Money Policy
From the foregoing discussion it can be seen that through banking reforms
the Administration had succeeded in strengthening the banking system and in
gaining control ever the Federal Reserva System. And the Federal Reserve
System, by means ef open market operations and low rediscount rates, contrib-
19
uted to lowering interest rates. The bank loan rates in New York city
averaged 5.76 in 1929» 2«45 in 1934 and 2«07 in 1939* Those in ether lead¬
ing cities ranged from 5.82 to 7*1 in 1929* They were lowered to 2*87-6*2
in 1939* Hewevor, it is doubtful that the Federal Reserve measures were
the most important factors in making the rate of interest low. It is likely
that even if the System had not pursued an easy money policy, the mere ex¬
istence of large excess reserves would have been enough te induce member
banks to lower the rate of interest substantially in order to encourage bor¬
rowing*
However, low rates of interest alone was not enou^ to induce borrowing*
As Table 3 shows, loans of all member banks had not increased much during
the 1930's* They were more than $26 billion at the end of 1929* At the
end of 1933, however, they were only $12.8 billion, less than one half of
tho 1929 total* From 1934 to the end of 1938, they remained at $12-13 bil¬
lion and on June 30, 1939, they were $13*1 billion, only $0«3 billion mere
than the leans of 1933*
TABLE 3
LOANS OF ALL MEMBER BANKS* AND INDUSTRIAL
PRODUCTION (1935-39 * 100) 1929-1939
Year Loans
(Million)
Production Year Leans Production
1929 26,150 110 1936 13,360 103
1933 12,833 69 1937 13,958 113
1934 12,028 75 1938 13,208 89
1935 12,175 87 1939 13,141 108
♦End-of-year figures, except 1939, which are June 30 figures*
Source I Loanst Federal Reserve Bulletin* Dee* 1939, p* 1105*
Production! Ibid*. Dee*, 1942, p* 1231*
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vyhen we further compare the rate of increase in bank loans with the
rate of increase in the volume of industrial production, as in Table 3,
it immediately becomes clear that the former is much less than the latter.
In the 1935-37 period, business showed substantial improvement. The Federal
Reserve index of industrial production increased from 87 in 1935 to 113 in
1937, an increase of about 30^, while bank loans increased from $12,175
million in 1935 to $13,958 million in 1937, an increase of only 14%. The
question arises as to wiiy bank loans failed to increase proportionally as
the volume of industrial production increased, when the cost of borrowing
was the lowest in 1937, The answer seems to lie in the growth of business
savings during the 1920's. Table 4 shows that during 1919-23, annual busi¬
ness savings by corporations and unincorporated firms were $2,7 billion.
TABLE 4
BUSINESS SAVINGS, 1919-1938
(Current prices, billions of dollars)
Year Uveragej Corporation Unincorporated
firms
Total
1919-23 1.0 1.7 2.7
1924-28 1.0 1.3 2.3
1929-33 -2.2 -1.5 -3.7
1934-38 -1.6 0.4 -1.2
1919-28 1.0 1.5 2.5
1929-38 -1.9 -0.6 -2.4
Source I Computed from S. Kuznets, National Income and Its Composition»
1919-1938 (New Yorkt National Bureau of Economic Research), vol. I, p, 276,
Table 39.
and during 1924-28 they averaged $2,3 each year. Thus in the ten years
1919-1928, business savings totalled $25 billion which were more than enough
to offset the dissavings which occurred from 1929 to 1938 ($24.5 billion).
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Because of previous savings therefore, businessmen were able to finance
themselves during the 1930*s and needed less loans from the banks.
Other reasons why businessmen did not increase borrowing might have
been "the lack of confidence ... during the period of New Deal experimenta¬
tion," and the diminished markets due to less purchasing power in the de¬
pression. Had there not been large business savings, it was still doubtful
that a low rate of interest would have induced much borrowing for investment.
Some economists believed, in the 1930*s, that when the economy was in a
downswing, "the rate of interest can have little or no stimulating influence
on the rate of investment," except "in the completion of projects already
started or at least previously decided upon," and "in industries which are
undergoing so rapid a development relative to others that their absolute ex-
2
pension continues even v\dien aggregate income is falling." This is true be¬
cause investment depends largely on favorable long-term expectation. In a
depression, especially a prolonged one as that of the 1930*s, businessmen
are not willing to tie up funds in long-term investment because of the un¬
certainties of the future and the prevalent pessimistic outlook. There is
no doubt, of course, that a depression would be more precipitous if the
rate of interest were high. But it is also true that while a low rate of
interest is desirable in a depression, what it can accomplish is rather lim¬
ited. The experience of the 1930*s seems to have proved this beyond doubt.
1
J. H. Williams, "The Implications of Fiscal Policy for Monetary Policy
and the Banking System," American Economic Review. Supplement. March, 1942,
p. 242.
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R. M. Bissell, "The Rate of Interest," American Economic Review. Supple¬




The second main purpose of the monetary policy of the New Deal was
price raising. Roosevelt was convinced by Professor Vbrren that restora¬
tion of the price level of 1926 would bring with it the prosperity of that
year. Also, higher prices would relieve the debt-burdened farmers who were
among the most distressed persons in the depression. Speaking to the nation
by radio on May 7, 1933, President Roosevelt saidt
The Administration has the definite objective of raising connedity
prices to such an extent that those idio have borrowed money will,
on the average, be able to repay that money in the same kind of
dollar which they borrowed. We do not seek to let them get sudi a
cheap dollar that they will be able to pay back a great deal less
than they borrowed. In other words, we seek to correct a wrong
and do not create another wrong in the opposite direction.^
In a coomunication addressed to the Wbrld Economic Conference in
London in July, 1933, the President declared hie purpose of price raising
in these words a
Let me be frank in saying that the United States seeks the kind of a
dollar idiidi, a generation hence, will have the same purchasing and
debt paying power as the dollar value we hope to attain in the near
future.
There was to be a stable dollar, or a dollar based on commodity values.
A dollar would always be worth a given amount of commodities. It was for
this purpose that the dollar was devalued and new decisions were made for
monetary use of gold and silver.
It has often been said that the purpese of the price-raising program
was to cause inflation, but we can see that this was an exaggeration. The
1
Roosevelt, op. cit.. vol. I, p. 166.
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real purpose of the price raising was to increase commodity prices to the
1926 level and then stabilize them there so as to "stop deflation without
1
causing inflation." G. F. Warren, Roosevelt's adviser, actually said that
"if Instead of reflation the deflation process is resumed, the chaos of
1932 will begin again. If a policy is followed whidi will raise conmodity
prices much above the level of 1926, price relationship of the type that
2
developed from 1916 to 1917 would result."
The only way to raise commodity prices to the 1926 level, according to
Warren, was to reduce the gold content of the dollar. "If the gold value
of the dollar is reduced enough to restore an equilibrium in the price
structure ... Viholesale prices of all commodities would gradually rise to
the average level that prevailed at the time public and private debts were
contracted, and the level to which taxes, costs of distribution, and other
slow-moving charges are adjusted. This would require that wholesale prices
3
be restored to approximately the 1926 level."
But as long as the nation was on the gold standard, and as long as gold
was in the Federal Reserve System, a higher price of gold or the devaluation
of the gold dollar made a large "profit" possible, since more dollars could
be issued against the same amount of gold. The Government wanted this
"profit" for its own purposes. Therefore, it was necessary for the Government
to get the geld out of the Federal ResOrve System and to have complete control
over it. The Government took two steps to achieve thist (1) departure from
1







the gold etandardf and (2) purchase of gold*
II« Devaluation of the Gold Dollar
In the banking crisis of 1933, the iinnedlate cause of the closing of
the banks was the run on the Federal Reserve Banks for gold* Vthen the
crisis became acute, people began to exchange their currency for geld, and
to hoard the gold* The Federal Reserve Banks continued to pay out gold,
and the supply was rapidly decreasing* 1i\hen the President proclaimed a
national bank holiday on March 5, he also pr<^ibited payments in gold, ex¬
port, or earmarking of gold, and pexmission to withdraw or transfer gold
or silver coin, or bullion, in order to prevent hoarding* The embargo on
gold was raised with the ending of the bank moratorium on March 12’, but
restrictions were placed on the movement of gold* It was required that the
Secretary of the Treasury should license all transactions in gold for export*
On April 5, President Roosevelt, by virtue of the authority vested in
him by the Emergency Banking Law, issued an erder prohibiting "the hoarding
of gold coin, gold bullion and gold certificates within the continental
United States by individuals, partnership, associations and corporations*"
Under this order every person, firm, or institution, was required to return
all gold coin, gold bullion, or gold certificates exceeding $100 to Federal
Reserve Banks or member banks and receiw» other coin or currency of the
United States*
Thus the nation was practically off the gold standard because gold could
not be obtained to make settlements* But it was not until ^ril 20 that
that fact was proclaimed by the President* On that day the President an¬
nounced a rule prohibiting the further licensing of gold exports* This ac¬
tion and a resolution by Congress abolishing the gold-payment clause in
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contracts took the nation coirplately eff the gold standard* This caused
much alazm among tradition*minded conservatives* Lewis Douglas, the
President's Director of the Budget, lamented, "This is the end of Western
Civilian."
In order to facilitate the devaluation of the gold dollar, the President,
on October 25, 1933, authorized the Reconstruction Finance Corporation te
buy newly mined domestic gold, and a committee was named te set prices*
The statutory price of gold had been $20*67 an ounce, but owing te conditions
abroad the world price was $29*80 an ounce on October 24, idiich meant that
the dollar was worth 72 cents* The first price te be set was $31*36 an ounce,
equivalent te a 66*cent dollar* Thereafter the price was successively raised
until it reached $34*45 on January 31, 1934, when devaluation brought the di¬
rect governmental gold purchase to an end*
The President was authorized to devalue the gold dollar by two acts, the
Thomas Amendment te the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May 12, 1933, and the
Gold Reserve Act of January, 1934* The Thomas Amendment te the AAA author¬
ized the President te do any or all of three thingst (l) increase the amount
of money in circulation by three billion dollars through ^en market opera¬
tions of the Federal Reserve Banks} (2) issue up to three billion dollars
in United States Notes; and (3) reduce the gold content of the dollar by as
much as fifty percent*
The Gold Reserve Act of 1934 affirmed and extended the Government's power
over gold* It transferred the legal title to the gold in the Federal Reserve
System to the Government, withdrew all gold from circulation, gave the
1
Ernest K* Lindley, The Roosevelt Revolution (New Yorks The Viking Press,
1933), p* 120*
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Treasury absolute power over gold for all purposes, including the rigjit
to buy and sell gold at home and abroad, and permitted the President to
vary the gold content of the dollar between 50 and 60 percent of its fozmer
value* Out of the "profit" from devaluation, $2 billion was to be used as
a stabilization fund for foreign exdiange and government securities, and
the balance was to go to the Treasury* Immediately upon approval of the
law, the President devalued the dollar at 59.06 cents and the Treasury set
the price of gold at $35 an ounce*
III* Evaluation of the Devaluation
It has been stated that the puipose of the devaluation of the gold dollar
was to raise commodity prices to the 1926 level and then stabilize them at
that level* It was expected that prices would rise by as such as devaluation
raised the price of gold or in proportion to the increase in the monetary
gold stock* The relationship between the gold stock, physical volume of
production, and prices which Warren derived from statistical data was
1
Gold - Prices* Therefore, if the gold stock in
Hiysical volume of production
tense of the dollar was increased, and the volume of production remained
constant, prices would rise in this proportion* This is an oversimplified
equation udiich can be true only when several unrealistic conditions exist.
In the first place, the velocity of money should not change in the opposite
direction as the quantity of gold dianges* If the velocity of circulation
of money falls to one>half when the stock of monetary geld is doubled, ether
things being equal, there will be no effect on prices. The failure to take
velocity of money into account was one of the defects Of Warren*s theory*
-
Warren, eo cit*. p* 80*
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Secondlyf even if the velocity ef money does not change» in an economy
with fractional gold reserves for its currency, prices would rise propor¬
tionally with the gold stock only when (l) all the gold is utilized as bank
reserves, (2) all banks are leaned up so that there are no excess reseinres,
and (3) there is full employment of factors so that increased spending
caused prices to rise or was due to higher prices, not to increase in pro¬
duction. The chain between prices and gold will be broken vriienoMer any one
of these conditions does not exist.
Let us now examine the situations in viAtich this theory was expected to
work. Column (1) of Table 5 shows that the monetary gold stock of the
TABLE 5
MONEY GOIJ) STOCK, DEMAND DEPOSITS, DEPOSIT














1929 $4,284 million $16,647 million 53.6 95.3
1933 4,036 12,089 26.8 65.9
1934 8,002 15,686 26.3 74.9
1935 9,693 18,801 24.9 80.0
1936 11,045 21,647 24.7 80.8
1937 12,803 20,387 24.7 86.3
1938 14,065 22,293 21.6 78.6
1939 17,091 25,681 20.2 77.1
Sources t
(1) Federal Reserve Bulletin for the years referred to. End of year
figures were used.
(2) Demand deposits of all member banks, adjusted. Interbank and U. S.
Government deposits, and cash items reported as in process of collection excludec
End of year figurest Federal Reserve Bulletin for the years referred to.
(3) Deposit Velocity, all commercial bankst Richard T. Selden, The Post¬
war Rise In the Velocity of Money (New Yorks National Bureau of Economic
Research), Table A-3.
(4) Vilhelesale Pricest Federal Reserve Bulletin. Dec., 1942, p. 1231.
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United States increased rapidly from $4,036 million in 1933 to $17,091
million in 1939, more than four times* Column (2) shows the demand de¬
posits of all member banks, excluding interbank and United States Government
deposits, and cash items in process of collection* They increased from
$12,089 million in 1933 to $25,681 million in 1939, somevdiat more than
double* Column (3) shows the deposit velocity of all member banks* It is
the ratio of debits to demand deposits, excluding interbank and United States
Government deposits* It measures the rapidity with «d)idi d«nand deposits
"turned over" each year* It reflects directly the fluctuations of business
activity since rising business activity needs more intensive and efficient
use of demand deposits, and vice versa* From column (3) we can see that
deposit velocity throughout the depression years declined steadily* Column
(4) shows the index number of wholesale prices, using the 1926 level as the
base* Although the index rose from 65*9 in 1933 to 86*3 in 1937, it declined
to 77.1 in 1939.
Several relationships may be seen in the tablet
(1) Although demand deposits increased from $12,089 million in 1933 to
$25,681 million in 1939, because of the increase of the monetary gold stock,
they did not increase as rapidly as the gold stock did* In 1933, the gold
stock was only one third of the total demand deposits* In 1939, howeMsr,
the ratio of gold stock to demand deposits increased to 66^* This means
that not all the increased stock was utilized for credit expansion* The
fact that banks accumulated large excess reserves during this period is ad¬
ditional evidence*
(2) The fact that deposit velocity declined during this period meant
that though demand deposits were doubled from 1933 to 1939, they were not
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utilized as intensively in 1939 as they were in 1933. In other words, the
volume of business transactions did not increase as much as demand deposits
increased. This shows that the significance of the increase in demand de¬
posits was not great.
(3) It should be clear now that the conditions that were necessary for
Warren*8 theory to be valid did not exist in the 1930*s. The existence of
unemployment and idle resources was another factor which alone would have
broken the direct relationship between gold and prices as shown in Warren*s
equation, if all the other necessary conditions had existed. It is not sur¬
prising, therefore, that prices did not rise because of the devaluation of
the gold dollar. In 1934 when the price of gold increased by 69^ from $20.67
an ounce to $35 an ounce, and the monetary gold stock increased by 98^ from
$4,036 million to $8,002 million, wholesale prices increased by only 13^,
from 65.9 in 1933 to 74.9 in 1934. They rose to 86.3 in 1937, but declined
again in 1938 and were 77.1 in 1939, only slightly above the 1934 level.
They never reached the 1926 level (=100) in any single year.
In short, the price-raising program ef the New Deal failed because busi¬
ness activity was not stimulated by it. By the criterion of the quantity
theory of money (MV=PT), it failed because it aimed at increasing P by in¬
creasing M without taking V and T into consideration.
Many economists criticized the price-raising program in the 1930*8 and
40's. H. P. Neisser regarded the attempt to raise prices by devaluation as
fallacious because it was "the expansion of domestic demand** that was im-
1
portant for prices to rise. F. Machlup shared this point of view and
i ~~
H. P. Neisser, "The Price Level and the Gold Production," American
Economic Review. ProceedInos. Febmiary, 1941, p. 7.
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concluded that "the devaluation was mistake."
On December 31y 1933f the New York Times published an open letter from
Keynes to Roosevelt, in which Keynes criticized the early New Deal policies.
He wrote that rising prices were to be welcomed "because they are usually a
symptom of rising output and employment." Therefore, "it is essential to
ensure that the recovery shall not be held back by the Insufficiency of the
supply of money to support the increased monetary turnover," Warning against
the unhealthiness of a price rise that preceded rather than followed an in¬
crease in output and enpleyment, he added, however, "the stimulation of out¬
put by increasing aggregate purchasing power is the right way to get prices
up{ and not the other way around." He regarded the attenqpt to raise prices
by devaluation ef the dollar as an example of "trying to put on flesh by
letting out the belt," because "ex^ange depreciation should follow the suc¬
cess of your domestic price-raising policy as its natural consequence, and
should not be allowed to disturb the tdiole world by preceding its justifi-
2
cation at an entirely arbitrary pace." The experience of the price-raising
program, no doubt. Justified Keynes's criticism.
IV. Economic Consequences of Devaluation
The only short-run advantage of the devaluation of the dollar was to
increase experts in 1934. As the price of gold was raised from $20.67 an
ounce to $35 an ounce, the geld content of the dollar was reduced from
23.22 grains to 14.28 grains. This meant that a unit of foreign currency
with a constant geld content could exchange for 62^ more U. S. dollars and
-
F. Machlup, "Ei^t Questions On Gold* A Review," Ibid.. p. 31.
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J. M. Keynes, "An Open Letter", New York Times. Dec, 31, 1933, section
8, p. 31.
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inport 62% more American goods. Many of the other currencies of the world
had depreciated since early 1933, but foreign currencies, in the fall of
1934, purchased an average of about 453^ more dollars than in the early
spring of 1933 and consequently could buy 4551^ more goods from the United
States. This was actually a less to the United States because now the United
States was giving 45^ more goods to foreign countries for the same amount of
foreign currencies, or for the same amount of foreign goods, when prices in
foreign countries did not change. But this affected the balance of payments
favorably. Exports of the United States increased from $1,674 million in
1933 to $2,132 million in 1934, and the excess of the value of exports over
the value of imports increased from $225 million in 1933 te $477 million in
1934. This was a substantial improvement in the balance of payments of the
United States.
However, the improvement in the balance of payments due to the devalu¬
ation could not and did not continue long. Neisser showed that the devalua¬
tion of the dollar put a deflationary pressure on other trading countries,
1
and prices in these countries declined in 1934 and 1935. This offset the
attractiveness of United States prices. Consequently the excess of the
value of United States exports over the value of imports declined to $235
million in 1935 and te $33 million in 1936.
Other effects of the devaluation were an enormous increase in geld pre-
duction and a large inflow of gold into the United States. The world*s
gold output, which averaged about 20 million ounces per year during the 1920*s,
reached 24 million in 1932, 29 million in 1935, and 39 million in 1939. The
-
Neisser, eo. cit.. pp. 7-8
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Increase in production was largely due to the increase in the price of gold*
There were two important reasons for the inflow of gold into the United
States since 1934* First, gold flowed in, in payment for the increased ex¬
ports in 1934 and, after 1937, for the purchase of supplies and equipment
in this country by European countries preparing for war* Secondly, and
more inqportant, there was a flight of capital into this country in quest of
safety* This was due to the disturbed conditions in Europe, and the fact
that a stable U. S* dollar seemed probable*
The gold stock of the United States was greatly increased* It is shown
in Table 5 that the stock rose from $4,036 million in 1933 to $17,091 million
in 1939* At the end of 1940, it stood at $21,506 million, or about 809^ of
all the monetary gold in the world* Consequently huge excess reserves ac¬
cumulated in the member banks, and this forced the Government to "sterilize”
a large part of it between December, 1936, and April, 1938, to prevent
1
enormous credit inflation* The reserve requirmnents of member banks were
also raised between May 1, 1937, and April 15, 1938* They were raised from
22 3/4 to 26^ for central reserve city banks, from 17^ to 20^ for reserve
city banks, and from 12^ to 14^ for country banks*
The large inflow of gold caused other countries to adopt managed money
policies, because with 809^ of the world's monetary gold in this country,
foreign monetary systems and international settlements could no longer be
based on gold* This led to the making of a Tripartite Monetary Agremnent
X
This was done by maintenance of an inactive gold account in the Treasury,
and by the sale of securities or the transfer of funds from commercial banks
to the Reserve Banks to offset the increase of deposits in commercial banks
idiich resulted from the sale of gold to the Treasury* This policy was aban¬
doned in 1938, following the recession of 1937, in order to stimulate new
credit expansion*
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between Britain, France, and the United States, in 1936. The three countries
asserted that it was desirable to stabilize exchange rates, and they paved
the way for later international monetary cooperation.
V. Silver Purchase
Another measure, though less inqsortant than the devaluation of the
dollar, vdtich the Administration took to raise domestic prices was to in¬
crease the price of silver by purchasing silver. This should have been an¬
other way of cheapening the dollar abroad because the purchases could have
caused the dollar te depreciate in terms of silver currencies in the Orient.
The silver school argued that "this method would raise the buying power of
the Orient, that it would thus encourage exports from the United States to
the Orient, and, therefore, that it would aid the United States in getting
1
rid of surpluses of cotton and other basic materials."
The Thomas Amendment te the Agricultural Adjustment Act of May, 1933
authorized the President to coin silver at a ratio to gold, which he might
fix. The London Economic Conference silver agreement of July, 1933 provided
that the United States was te buy 24.4 million ounces of silver annually,
and in December, 1933, the President proclaimed the beginning of silver pur¬
chases at the ratio of 16 te 1 of silver to gold. At that time the pur-
^ases were confined to domestic newly mined silver.
The Silver Purchase Act of June, 1934 provided that silver was to be pur¬
chased at home and abroad until the price either reached $1.29 an ounce or
until the country possessed one silver dollar for every three dollars of gold.
1
Lionel D. Edie, "Monetary Inflation and Price Raising," Yale Review.
vol. XXIIl, BfiC. 1933, p. 266.
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Silver certificates were te be issued against Treasury holdings of silver.
The President was authorized at his discretion te require the delivery ef
all silver te the mints and te pay for it a fair market price. Thus» in
August, 1934, under the terms of the act, all silver in the United States
was nationalized, and holders were forced to surrender their stocks te the
Treasury in return for silver certificates.
The Treasury was soon paying 77^ an eunce and was sustaining the world
silver market. The amount of silver certificates put inte circulation in~
creased frem $0.4 billion in June, 1934, to $1.7 billion in June, 1939, but
ewing te the inflow ef geld, the amount of silver never reached the statu¬
tory ratio ef one te four with geld. Rather, these certificates were sub¬
stituted for federal reserve notes. This helped to transfer control over
money and credit from the Federal Reserve Banks to the Treasury.
The silver purchase program was primarily motivated by the silver inter¬
ests in Congress. The representatives wanted "te do something for silver."
While the purchases failed to raise domestic prices, they gave a public
subsidy te the western silver producers. It was harmful te countries on the
silver standard. China was driven off the silver standard and inte monetary
distress. After an unsuccessful appeal to the United States, she national¬
ized silver and began te manage her currency.
CHAPTER IV
SUMf^IARY OF ANALYSIS OF MONETARY POUCY
I* Easy Money
Monetary policy played an Inqoortant role in the early years of the New
Deal program* The Roosevelt Administration was preocctipied with easy money
policy and the raising of prices as major means to recovery* It was believed
that low rates of interest and higher prices would provide the incentives
which were necessary for businessmen to increase borrowing for new invest*
ment* They would then increase employment and output* This would lift the
econony out of the depression*
To make monetary policy effective, it was essential for the banking
system to have the confidence of the pe^le. By March, 1934, people had
lest confidence in the banking system because of heavy bank failures, and
the banking system came to a standstill* The Roosevelt Administration, by
emergency measures, saved the banking system from total collapse. The Bank¬
ing Acts of 1933 and 1935 gave great powers to the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve Syst^ over rediscount rates, open market operations, and
reserve requirements of the Reserve System* These Acts strengthened the
banking syst«D and provided a background which was necessary for effective
monetary measures*
In order to give member banks additional reserves and encourage more
lending, the Federal Reserve System purchased government securities in the
open market* It also reduced rediscount rates successively from 2^9^3^ in
1933 to l-li^^ in 1939 in an attempt to induce member banks to increase re¬
discounting or borrowing* This was also intended to lower the rates member
banks charged their customers in order to induce more borrowing*
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In spite of lew rediscount rates, the velume ef bills rediscounted at
the Reserve Banks declined from $98 million in 1933 to $7 million in 1939*
This was due to two factors! (1) the accumulation ef excess reserves of
member banks ($6«2 billion in 1939 as against $0.7 billion in 1933), and
(2) large holdings of government securities by member banks ($13*8 billion
in 1939 as against $6*9 billion in 1933)* These two factors enabled member
banks to adjust their reserve positions without borrowing or rediscounting
commercial paper* Thus the influence of the Reserve System ever member
banks was greatly weakened.
The easy money policy of the Federal Reserve System contributed te the
lowering ef interest rate* But more important still was the accumulation
ef large excess reserves vdiich induced member banks to lower the rates ef
interest in order to encourage borrowing. The rates of interest were low¬
ered from 5*76-7*1^ in 1929 te 2*07-6*2^ in 1939. However, the loans of
all member banks did not increase much* The leans were $13*1 billion in
1939 as against $12*8 billion in 1933* The rate of increase in bank leans
was clearly mudi less than the rate of increase in production. The index of
industrial production was 108 in 1939 as against 69 in 1933.
The failure of lew rates of interest te induce borrowing was attributed
to two factors! (1) large business savings in the 1920's ($25 billion from
1919 to 1928) trtiich were more than enough te offset the dissavings ($24*5
billion) which occurred from 1929 to 1938, and, mere important still, (2)
lack of confidence ef businessmen and uncertainties of the future in the




The Roosevelt Administration attenpted to raise commodity prices by
devaluation of the gold dollar and purchases of silver* It was argued by
Warren that prices would rise proportionately with the increase in monetary
gold stock and that a restoration of the price level of 1926 would bring
about the prosperity of that year*
In April, 1933, the President prohibited the hoarding and export of gold
and thus put the nation off the gold standard* Gold was also purchased by
the Reconstruction Finance Corporation from October, 1933, to January, 1934*
In the latter month, the President, by virtue of the authority vested in him
by the Gold Reserve Act of 1934, devalued the dollar at 59*6 cents, and the
Treasury set the price of gold at $35 an ounce*
After the devaluation of the dollar, prices failed te rise by as much as
was expected* The index of wholesale prices was 77*1 in 1939 as against
65*9 in 1933 and 74*9 in 1934* There were several factors which made Warren's
theory invalid* (1) Not all monetary gold was utilized for credit expansion.
The geld stock increased from $4 billion in 1933 to $17*1 billion in 1939,
more than four times, but the demand deposits of all member banks increased
from $12*1 billion in 1933 te $25*7 billion in 1939, about two times* (2)
The deposit velocity or the annual turn>over rate of demand deposits declined
from 26*8 in 1933 te 20*2 in 1939, because of low business activities* (3)
The existence of unemployment and idle resources absorbed part of the increase
in money stipply* The price-raising program of the New Deal failed because it
aimed at increasing P by increasing M without taking V and T into considera¬
tion (MV=PT).
Many economists regarded the attempt to raise prices by devaluation as
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fallacious. Keynes criticized it as "trying to put on flesh by letting out
the belt," because he thought that a price rise was the consequence, and
not the cause, of an increase in output and employment.
The immediate effect of the devaluation of the dollar was to increase
exports in 1934, because the American prices in terms of foreign currencies
were cheaper than before. The excess of the value of exports over the value
of imports increased from $225 million in 1933 to $477 million in 1934.
This affected the balance of payments of the United States favorably. How¬
ever, exports did not continue to increase because prices abroad fell in
1934 and 1935.
The devaluation also led to a large inflow of gold into the United States.
This was partly due to the disturbed conditions in Europe and partly to the
prospect of a stable U. S, dollar. The gold stock of the United States rose
from $4 billion in 1933 to $17.1 billion in 1939 and $21.5 billion in 1940
which was about 80/^ of all the monetary gold in the world. This led to huge
excess reserves in the banks and caused other countries to adopt managed
money policies.
The Roosevelt Administration also purchased silver in an attempt to
raise domestic prices. It was argued that higher price of silver would en¬
able sil'wer countries in the Orient to buy more surplus goods from the
United States. But in fact, silver purchases were motivated by silver in¬
terests in Congress "to do something for silver."
Silver purchases were begun in December, 1933, at the ratio of 16 to 1 of
silver to gold. The Silver Purchase Act of June, 1934, authorized the Presi¬
dent to nationalize all silver in the United States. This was done in August,
1934. Silver certificates were issued against Treasury holdings of silver.
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The amount of silver certificates in circulation increased from $0,4 bil¬
lion in June, 1934, to $1,7 billion in June, 1939, The Treasury continued
to purchase silver from abroad. The purchases, however, did not raise do¬
mestic prices. They were harmful to silver countries, especially China,
What they accomplished was to give a public subsidy to the Western silver
producers.
III. Conclusions
From the analysis in chapter II and III two conclusions are to be drawn*
(1) Cheap money alone is not sufficient to induce borrowing and stimu¬
late recovery in a depression. All that cheap money can do during a depres¬
sion is to provide a background which is favorable to recovery. But a favor¬
able background alone does not make recovery. Recovery has to come frcxn
more powerful measures vrfjich change the outlook of the economy and can lift
it out of depression. When too nuch faith is placed in easy money policy,
as was the case in the early 1930’s, it will fail to achieve what is expected
of it.
While easy money is not sufficient to cause investment to increase in a
depression, it does encourage investment somewhat or is favorable to it.
Investment is likely to be discouraged by high interest rates in a depression.
Therefore, it is desirable to keep the rate of interest low.
(2) When business activities are low, prices may not be raised by simply
increasing the supply of money, because the velocity of circulation of money
is likely to decline. Wien the decline in the velocity of circulation of
money is greater than the increase in money supply, prices may ewn fall.
Since the velocity of circulation of money reflects directly the fluctuations
of business activity, it is more important to stimulate business activity by
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increasing purchasing pewer than to try to raise prices by increasing the
supply ef money* When business activities are stimulated* the velocity
ef circulation of money will rise and prices will naturally rise* A price




The purpose of the fiscal policy of the New Deal was to increase the
purchasing power of the economy directly by goverraoent expenditures financed
mainly by borrowing. At first it was believed that the increased purchasing
power would so stimulate private enterprise that it would gain monentum on
its own and lift the economy out of depression. Then public expenditures
could be gradually tapered off. This argument was known as the punqs priming
theory. Public spending was regarded as an expediency and deficit financing
was to be temporary. Also, in the early years of the New Deal, especially
before 1935, the Roosevelt Administration was preoccupied with easy money
policy and the raising of prices. But later when it became clear that mone¬
tary policy was ineffectivs to combat the depression and bring about recov¬
ery, emphasis was gradually shifted from monetary policy to fiscal policy,
and public expenditure played an Important role in the New Deal pregram.
In 1937 when government expenditure was reduced, a recession quickly set in.
Thereafter, the Government resumed its spending. The experience of the 1937
recession and the influence of Keynes, after the publication of The General
Theory of Eaployment, Interest and Money in 1936, led the Administration to
accept anti-depression public expenditure as a new policy of the government.
Deficit spending was deliberately undertaken as a "conpensatory” measure to
combat the depression.
In this chapter, we are going to survey the first phase of the fiscal
policy of the New Deal, i.e., the pump-priming program. The compensatory
spending program of the New Deal after 1937 and the evaluation of the fiscal
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policy of the New Deal are reserved for the next chapter*
I. Punp Priming Theory
The theory of punp priming fcy the New Deal Administration before 1937
was that by public spending during a depression, purchasing power would be
increased* Consumer purchases would rise, and there would be increases in
employment, profits, and prices* Thus private investment would be stimulated*
New government expenditure, like a few cups of water poured into a cylinder,
would increase suction and thereafter the pump would continue te draw more
and more water* With the pump primed and working of its own accord, govern-
1
ment spending would be tapered off*
Later the argument became more Keynesian. It was maintained that an
increase in government spending would constitute a net addition to total
spending if it were deficit-financed or financed with money which otherwise
would have been saved* Also, government spending would give rise to secon¬
dary and tertiary expenditure, because funds spent by the government would
be respent successively by the recipients. Thus it would have a "multiplier
2
effect" on national income*
Keynes thought it inportant that the public spending should be financed
by "leans*" It should not be "merely a transfer, through taxation, from ex-
3
isting incomes*" It applies te "all additional expenditure made, not in
1
Beard & Smith, op* cit*. p* 161*
2
J. M. Keynes, The Means te Prosperity (Londons Macmillan & Co., 1933)*
Reprinted in Economics Books, bearing the same title, pp* 14-45. See also
R. F, Kahn, "The Relation of Home Investment to Unenployment," Econwaic
Journal* June, 1931, pp* 183-186*
3
Keynes, "Open Letter," New York Times*
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substitution for other expenditure» but out of savings or out of borrowed
money*" It also applies to a reduction of taxation,''for the increased
spending power of the taxpayer will have precisely the same favorable reper-
2
cussiens as increased spending power due te loan-expenditure*"
Keynes's theory was based upon the assumption that government expendi¬
ture would have the same multiplier effect on national income as private ex¬
penditure* This can be true only when the "marginal propensity te censtanoy"
v^ich gives rise to subsequent respending and which deteimines the magnitude
3
of the multiplier, is the same in both cases* In a depression this is not
likely to be true* In the first place, as J* M. Clark contended, "unlimited
4
deficit financing does impair business confidence," and may bring about a
pessimistic outlook, which would make people more cautious in spending*
Secondly, when public deficit-spending is regarded as an expediency and must
come to an end before long, "business may for that reason fail to respond
with increased expenditure on its durable productive equipment, such as it
would make if the same increase in business came from purely private sources*
Consequently people's marginal propensity to consume is likely te be much less
than in the case of increase in private expenditure* A large increase in
government expenditure, then, may cause a relatively small secondary and
1




According te Keynes, the multiplier (k) is equal te
1
1 - the marginal propensity te consume* See General Theory* chapt* 10.
4
J. M. Clark, "Cumulative Effects of Changes in Aggregate Spending As




tertiary spending. Its multiplier effect on national income may be less
than that of a comparable increase in private expenditure. This is a pessi*
bility which Keynes did not discuss.
Of course, as Gayer suggested, "government spending may also be inter¬
preted as an assurance that business will get ne worse, se that private ex¬
penditures hitherte postponed for fear of further business deterioration are
1
new undertaken." What the outcixne will be, therefore, must depend largely
on the attitude and response of businessmen. A responsive economy is a nec¬
essary condition for Keynes's theory to work.
Keynes suggested a public works program for new expenditure, but said
that "preference should be given to those idiidi can be made to mature quickly
on a large scale, as, for example, the rehabilitation of the physical condi-
2
tien of the railroads."' Different opinions were held by seme economists.
It was argued by Clark that a public works program might be detrimental to
private investment because it might "bid up costs of construction against
3
private enterprise, or prevent them from falling low enough to be attractive."
Slichter shared this point of view. He thought public works were subject to
the iiq>ortant limitation that "they svpport markets but do not remove the
fundamental maladjustments which precipitate depression.... attempts to sup¬
port the market for capital goods may defeat their purpose by keeping vp the
1
A. D. Gayer, "Fiscal Policies," American Economic Review. Supplement.






very prices s^ich must fall in order to make a resumption of growth profit¬
able**
However, a public works program was started for New-Deal pump-priming.
But in the early years of the New Deql there was still a lingering hope of
a balanced budget, vdiich Reesevelt had promised in his first campaign.
Keynes's emphasis on deficit financing, therefore, made it difficult for tho
Administration to accept his theory fully. Also, the New Deal Administration
was then preoccupied with cheap money policy and the raising of prices, and
there was the fear that fiscal policy would be used as a wedge to impose
socialism.
It was only after the creation of the Works Progress Administration in
1935 that pump priming became the dominant anti-depression policy of the
New Deal and that the Keynesian nature of the New Deal became increasingly
clear.
II. Public Works
The anti-depression expenditures of the Roosevelt Administration were
classified by the Treasury into two main categories* general expenditure,
and recovery and relief expenditure. The latter included* (1) relief, (2)
public works, and (3) all other expenditure such as agricultural aid, aid to
home owners, and miscellaneous items. Each of these items served its own
purpose and contributed to recovery. We shall study the public works program
only, because it was public works which dominated and characterized the pump
priming program of the New Deal.
-
Summer Slichter, "The Economics of Public Works,** American Economic
Review. Supplement. March, 1934, p. 184.
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The public works program was designed to combine immediate relief with
recovery and long-range growth, in order to assist industry, labor, and
the unemployed. It was started with the establishment of the Public Works
Administration in June, 1933, and became a major factor in recovery when
the I'forks Progress Administration was created in 1935,
The National Industrial Recovery Act of June 16, 1933, provided for a
Public Works Administration with allotments aggregating over $1-|- billion
1
for more than 15,000 federal projects. The projects included public build¬
ings, highways, and parkways. One notable achievement was the Grand-Coulee
Dam on the Columbia River, But active prosecution of the projects was de¬
layed and so a maximum relief of unemployment was not afforded. It was a
Works Progress Administration, headed by Harry Hopkins, which furnished most
of the jobs.
The Works Progress Administration was created under the Emergency Relief
Appropriation Act of 1935 which made available $4,7 billion. The main idea
was that employment on public projects would preserve the workers* self-re¬
spect, conserve skill, and utilize vast resources for the creation of wealth,
WPA began to provide jobs in August, 1935. By 1941 it had employed over 8
million individuals, or one fifth of all workers in the country. In the
first six years of the IVPA (to July, 1941) total expenditure on projects was
$11.4 billion. Seventy-eight per cent was spent on construction and conser¬
vation projects, and the rest was devoted to community service programs.
74,2^ of the total cost was labor cost. The construction and engineering
i
National Resources Planning Board, Security, Vhrk and Relief Policies
(Washington; Government Printing Office, 1942), p, 34,
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projects accounted for more than 75^ of the empleyment provided* The Pro¬
gram listed everything "from the construction of highways to the extermina¬
tion of rats; from the building of stadiums to the stuffing of birds; from the
improvement of airplane landing fields to the making of Braille books; from
the building of over a million ..* privies to the playing of the world's
2
great symphonies*" It reached an eirqsloyment peak ef, 3,330,000 in November,
1938. In September, 1931, when World War II broke out, there were still
1,654,000 on WPA, and the program was not finally liquidated until June, 1941*
Also inportant in its effect on recovery was the Tennessee Valley Author¬
ity, though its primary objective was refozm rather than pump priming* The
act creating the TVA was passed by the Hundred Days Congress on May 18, 1933.
The total amount of Congressional appropriations for the TVA from 1933 te
1940 was $270 million. From the standpoint of social reform and "planned
economy," the TVA was by far the most revolutionary of all the New Deal
schemes. It brought to the Tennessee River basin not only full employment
and the blessings of cheap electric power, but lew-cost housing, abundant
cheap nitrates, the restoration of eroded soil, reforestation, improved navi¬
gation, and flood control. By lifting the population in the area out of
poverty in a cumulative way, it augmented the demand for consumption and con¬
tributed to bringing about recovery to the area, and elsewhere.
According to Gayer's estimates, shown in Table 6, total public works ex¬
penditures of federal and local governments increased from $1.8 billion in
1933, to $3.8 billion in 1936. Total expenditures of federal and local
governments increased from $12.2 billion in 1933 to $17*4 billion in 1937.
1
Ibid., p. 556, appendix 3*
2
Donald S. Howar, The WPA and Federal Relief Policy (New Yorki Russell
Sage Foundation, 1943), p. 126.
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From these figures it can be seen that the ratie of public works expenditures
to total government expenditures became greater and greater. As colum (3)
of Table 6 shows» the ratie was 15^ in 1933. It rose to 1^ in 1934, and al~
though it declined somewhat, to 17^ in 1935, it increased to 22^ in 1936. It
is clear that public works expenditure played a more and more important role
in the spending program of the New Deal.
TABLE 6













1933 $1.8 billion $12.2 billion 15
1934 2.6 14.4 18
1935 2.6 15.0 17
1936 3.8 17.4 22
a
Include federal & local governments expenditures
Conputed from A. D. Gayer, ’’Fiscal Policies,” American
Economic Review. Supplement. March, 1938, p. 99, table III.
III. The Recession of 1937
There was no doubt that the pump priming program of the New Deal con¬
tributed to increase in purchasing power and to the general stimulus to
private entexprise. The Federal Reser^ index of industrial production in¬
creased steadily from 69 in 1933 to 103 in 1936 (1935-39=100). The automo¬
bile industry was the one that was stimulated most. The Federal Reserve in¬
dex of automobile production increased from 99 in 1935 to 112 in 1936 and 121
in 1937 (1923-25=100), National income, at 1929 prices, increased from $56.7
billion in 1933 to $80.8 billion in 1937. Unenployment was reduced from
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12,6 million in 1933 to 7.3 million in 1937. These improvements were at¬
tributed by Hansen to an expanding consumer demand which was made possible
by (1) a $5 billion increase in consumer installment credit supporting pur¬
chases of automobiles and ether durable consumers* goods» and (2) $14 bil-
1
lion of feferal expenditures on recovery and relief. Thus so far as prim¬
ing the pump was concernedt the theory seemed to be justified.
But in the pump priming theory it was also argued that when the pump
was primed and working on its own momentum government expenditure could be
tapered off. This was important because the public debt and deficit spend¬
ing of the New Deal had been increasing rapidly. The public debt of the
federal government increased from $22.5 billion in 1933 to $33.5 billion in
1936 and $36.4 billion in 1937. Deficit spending rose from $3.1 billion in
1933 to $4.7 billion in 1936. Consequently Roosevelt's opponents criticized
severely the spending program of the New Deal, especially in the 1936 cam¬
paign.
The inprovement of business and the severe criticism of opponents must
have persuaded Roosevelt, in 1937, that the time had come to taper off the
new government expenditure. Spending of the feferal government, therefore,
was cut from $8.9 billion in the fiscal year of 1936 to $8.1 billion in 1937
and to $7.3 billion in 1938. The deficit was reduced from $4.8 billion in
1936 to $2.8 billion 1937 and $1.4 billion in 1938. But almost immediately
a sharp business recession set in. Industrial production fell from 113 in
1937 to 88 in 1938. Automobile production fell from 121 in 1937 to 63 in
1938. Unenployment rose from 7.3 million in 1937 to 9.9 million in 1938.
i
A. H. Hansen, Full Recovery or Stagnation (New Yorki W. W. & Noirton,
1938), p. 274.
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Thus the second phase of the pump priming theory proved to be invalid.
Government spending could net be tapered off without creating a recession,
unless private enterprise increased net investment sufficiently.
The recession of 1937 underlined the fact that in spite of the improve¬
ment in business up to 1937, private enteiprise gained little momentum on
its own. The explanation, according to Hansen, lay in the nature of the
recovery of 1934-37 itself. The recovery was mainly a ’’consumption recovery”
in which Investment followed consumption. This was different from former
1
recoveries in tdiich investment led the way. The increase in consumer demand
was due to the fact that the depression had restrained many people from buy¬
ing new automobiles and other durable consxjuner goods for many years. The
growing need for replacements, combined with the improved psychology follow¬
ing the banking and monetary reforms, ”released an accumulated backlog of
2
consumer demand for durable goods.” This new demand was financed by an
expansion of installment credit and government expenditure.
But in 1937, ”the automobile boom had tapered off. We were moving toward
a saturation point in installment sales* The government stimulus to consunnp-
tion was in process of being completely withdrawn in a dramatic reversal
3
from a plus of three billion dollars to zero within a single year.” Thus
the two stimuli to consuiption disappeared. Consequently consumption fell
and the acceleration principle began to work in reverse. Producers of capi¬
tal goods had to lay off workmen and they reduced output more than proportion¬








a recovery resting almost exclusively on a rising tide of con¬
sumption can go forward only so long as the consumption stimu¬
lus is applied. Worse yet, it cannot even maintain the level
reached once new funds are no longer poured into consumers*
markets,... Such a recovery can proceed no further than it is
pushed. It has no momentum of its own. It has no inner power
to complete its own development."^
It was because of the consumption nature of the recovery of 1934-37
that the recession of 1937 occurred when government expenditures were re¬
duced, It was clear, therefore, that in order to get out of the recession,
the government would have had to resume its spending. With the publica¬
tion of Keynes's General Theory of Employment, Interest and ^k)nev in 1936,
the New Deal became increasingly Keynesian and was to undertake deficit
spending, on a larger scale, as the major anti-depression policy. Beginning
in 1938, the New Deal entered the second stage of its public spending pro¬




I. Spending after 1937
After the recession of 1937, there was a shift of emphasis in public
spending, from stimulating private investment to compensating for the lack
of it* This was a fundamental diange* It rested on the view that private
enterprise was not capable of providing full employment) goverrment must
actually supplement private investment by public investment when, as in
1937, income and employment fell off* Public investment was regarded as m
pexmanent function of the goMsmment* Deficit spending was deliberately re->
garded as a major means of recovery and was to be continued as long as un¬
employment was above the noxmal percentage of the labor force*
Although this shift was gradual, nevertheless it was evident* In a mes¬
sage to Congress in November, 1937, Roosevelt referred to private investment
in 1937* He said, "government cannot let nature take its course without re¬
gard to consequences* If private enterprise does not respond, government
2
must take vqo the slack."
In April, 1938, the President sent to Congress his "Recoeunendatiens de-
3
signed to Stimulate Further Recovery." It was the first outright recommen¬
dation by the President designed to achieve recovery through fiscal policy.
Increased appropriations for WPA, Farm Security, and OCC were urged, with
; .
John H. Williams, "Deficit Spending," American Economic Review. February,
1941, p. 58.
2
Roosevelt, op. cit.. vol. VI*, p* 492.
3
Ibid., vol. VII, p. 221*
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the objective of increasing national income* The President also recommended
a large expansion of the general public works program*
Thus, beginning from the spring of 1938, the spending program was re¬
sumed with a new vigor* Outgrowing the earlier phase of punp priming, it
continued, on a larger scale, the previous activities — putting people to
useful work, generating business recovery and profits, subsidizing agricul¬
ture and other sectors of the economy, conserving the country's natural re¬
sources, wAiile building up the nation's physical wealth and increasing its
services to the people* In the spring of 1939, the President requested
Congress to vote recovery and relief expenditure of $9 billion* Though
Congress rejected the spending philosophy, it actually authorized $2 billion
more in expenditure (including relief and defense expenditure) than for 1938*
In the fiscal years 1938-1940, expenditure of the federal government
totalled about $25 billion* Of these, $6*4 billion was spent for unenploy-
ment relief, $2 billion for the Agricultural Adjustment Program, and $3*7
1
billion for national defense which was becomeing more and more important*
As a consequence, public debt increased from $36*4 billion in 1937 to $40*4
billion in 1939 and $43 billion in 1940.
II* Keynes and the New Spending Theory
The new spending theory was evidently Kenyesian* The President's advisers
had apparently accepted Keynes's point of view in the General Theory, and
based the new spending program on it*
The main ideas of the General Theory ares (l) there is a tendency towards
unemployment in a private entezprise society because of over-saving and under-
- ^
Federal Reserve Bulletin. December, 1940, p* 1304*
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vestmentt (2) it is necessary for government* by means of deficit spending
financed from idle savings,to compensate for the deficiency of private in>
vestment* in order to achieve full employment*
Keynes's ever-saving theory is derived from the "fundamental psycho¬
logical law ••• that men are disposed ••• to increase their eonsunption as
1
their income increases* but not by as much as the increase in their income*"
He further argued that since man's "propensity to consume" was less than one*
idien income rose* an increasing fraction of it was saved. Therefore* the
higher the income level* the wider is the gap between income and oonsumption*
Thus the economy suffers from a deficiency of demand and spending* To pre¬
vent reduction of income* output* and enployment* investment must increase
equally with saving* But investment is limited by the "marginal efficiency
of capital." As the capitalistic economy progresses it reaches a stage at
whidi the opportunities for investment decline and consequently the marginal
efficiency of capital declines* Also* the cost of investment cannot be re¬
duced sufficiently by lowering the rate of interest because at some minimum
rate we prefer liquid funds to the risk of investment*
Keynes's conclusion was that the propensity to consume and the rate of
new investment determine the volume of eoployment* "If the propensity to
consume and the rate of new investment result in a deficient effective donand*
the actual level of eoployment will fall short of the supply of labor poten-
2
tially available*" and unenpleyment will become unavoidable*
1
J. M, Keynes* The General Theory of Employment. Interest and Money
(Londons Macmillan & Co.* 1936)* p. 96*
2
Ibi^. * p* 30a
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Keynes** policy remmendations follow logically from his analysis* The
first is to reduce Interest rates* This would widen the gap between the
marginal efficiency of capital and the cost of investment* and induce busi¬
nessmen to borrow for installation of new plant and equipment* But he is
not optimistic about the effectiveness of this remedy since* by reason of
risk and other factors affecting "liquidity preference*" we cannot push the
rate below a certain minimum*
A second and more pewerful remedy* then* would have to be usedt deficit
spending to offset Idle saving or must tax away and spend the Idle saving*
If the Government spends more than it takes in from taxes* It would ob¬
viously increase total spending* This additional expenditure would in turn
produce further spending by those who received the money* thus having a mul¬
tiplying effect on national income*
Keynes placed great emphasis on effective demand* He believed that "the
mere existence of an insufficiency of effective demand may* and often will*
bring the increase of employment to a standstill before a level of full em-
1
ployment has been reached*" This* no doubt* was acc^ted by Roosevelt* In
his message to a special session of Congress in November* 1937* the President
saids
Vihat does the country ultimately gain if we encourage businessmen
to enlarge the capacity of American industry to produce unless we
see to it that the income of our working population actually ex-
pa^nds sufficiently to create markets to absorb that increased
production? *** Political and social harmony requires that every
state and every county not only produce goods for this nation's
markets but furnish markets for the nation's goods*^




Roosevelt* op. cit.* vol* VI, pp* 496-497*
56
The experience of 1938-39 should remove any doubt as to the effective¬
ness of a fiscal policy related to economic need*.** Government must
have the wisdom to use its credit to sustain economic activity in
periods of economic recession and the courage to withhold it and re¬
tire debt in periods of economic prosperity*
The President had accepted the Keynesian point of view that the recession
of 1937 had arisen from, among other factorsi "over-optimism which led the
1
Government to curtail its net expenditures too abruptly*"
III. Deficit Spending and Tax Reduction
Initiated by Keynes, a new theory of anti-depression fiscal policy was
developed* In periods of recession and depression, government should in¬
crease its expenditure and reduce its taxation, thus incurring deficit*
Conversely, in a period of boom and prosperity, the government should re¬
duce its expenditure and tax revenue will rise naturally because of rising
national income* The budget should balance*
That was the theory* In reality, however, the fiscal policies of the
New Deal were sometimes inconsistent and worked at cross purposes* For ex-
anple, during the depression, new taxes were introduced and tax rates were
raised when the Goveimment deliberately increased public expenditure* In
1934 there were increased liquor taxes, emergency taxes on corporations and
capital stock to provide for interest and amortization on the money borrowed
te finance the public works program, and there were processing taxes to
finance AAA* There were also increases in income, estate, and gift taxes
incoiporated in the Revenue Act of 1934* In 1935 there were increased indi¬
vidual surtaxes, and graduated corporation income tax* There was also an
1
Ibid.* vol* IX, p. 12*
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undistributed profits tax in March, 1936* As a result, the ratio of
federal taxes to gross national product increased from 3*5^ in 1929 to 7.5^
2
in 1937. The increased taxation, no doubt, aggravated the depression*
The effect of a reduction in tax rates on purchasing power, however, de¬
pends on the types of taxes that are reduced* A reduction in sales tax rates
must increase consumers' purchasing power* This may have an effect similar
to that of an increase in purchasing power brought about by additional
government spending* But a reduction of taxes vdiich results in an increase
in personal or business savings, and not an increase in spending, has little
effect on the actual purchasing power* A reduction, for instance, in the
corporate income tax, estate tax, or the progressive income tax on hi^ in-
3
comes may result in an increase in savings, and not in spending*
The question arises whether increased expenditure or a tax reduction is
more effecti\e in creating purchasing power in a depression. It depends
largely on how the expenditure is financed* Expenditure financed by means
of simultaneous taxation has little effect, since the money is a transfer of
purchasing power from the taxpayer to the receiver of government payments,
unless the tax revenue would otherwise have remained idle* The benefit pay¬
ments of the Agricultural Adjustment Administration of the New Deal, for ex-
anple, were financed by processing taxes on farm products* They might be
1
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3
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regarded as a shifting of purchasing power from the urban to the rural
population.
On the other handy expenditure financed by borrowed money may be more
effective than a tax reduction in creating purchasing power. Keynes said,
"the increased spending power of the taxpayer (due to a tax reduction) will
have precisely the same favorable repercussions as increased spending due
1
to loan-expenditure." This is not always true. In the first place* as
Colm said* "when some inqprovement in market conditions had already occurred*"
a reduction in sales taxes or payroll taxes "would result not in lower prices
but in increased profits* and the active purchasing power would not rise un-
2
til much later." This is true especially when producers have substantial
control over the market. Secondly* a reduction in personal and corporation
income taxes will lead to increased savings* especially by the high-inccxne-
bracket people* because as income rises* an increasing part of it will gen¬
erally be saved. The government* on the other hand* can spend as much as it
borrows and place purchasing power directly into the hands of those who need
it most. Therefore* it is likely that an increase in deficit spending will
be more effective than a tax reduction in creating purchasing power.
This does not mean, of course* that government expenditure financed by
borrowing will always have the same stimulating effect. For exanple* deficit
spending may be regarded as transfer of purdiasing power when Government bor¬
rowing "encroaches on private borrowers' demand and thereby replaces private
3
investment which would otherwise have occurred." And if the expenditure is
1
Keynes* Means to Prosperity, p. 18.
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59
60 concentrated on one particular industry that it exceeds available sourcesy
then it will raise costs rather than the volume of output and eiqployment*
But so long as there exists a huge amount of idle resources and excess re¬
serves, as was the case in the 1930*6, it may be assumed that government
borrowing does not involve a reduction of private borrowing or the replace¬
ment of private investment. The conclusion, therefore, is that a combination
of deficit spending and an appropriate tax reduction is the most desirable
policy for combating a depression.
IV. Consequences of Compensatory Spending
During this period of compensatory spending, national income, at 1929
prices, increased from $79 billion in 1938 to $87 billion in 1939. Public
debt increased from $37 billion in 1938 to $40 billion in 1939. The Federal
Reserve index of industrial production increased from 89 in 1938 to 108 in
1939 and 123 in 1940 (1935-39=100).
More important still was a new development that this new anti-depression
theory brou^t about in other fields of the New Deal program. A new anti¬
trust program was revived. It was argued that monopolists had not been gen¬
erous enough in their dealings with labor to provide sufficient purchasing
power for the needs of full employment. Therefore, along with deficit spend¬
ing, it was necessary to strike against monopolistic practices that diminished
the consumer's effective demand. Thuxman Arnold was called from Yale to head
the anti-trust activities vdtich continued until the outbreak of World War II.
Changes were also made in taxation, labor, agriculture, and social se¬
curity policies in haxmony with this new spending policy. Congress enacted
the Revenue Act of 1938 which repealed all but a token remnant of the excess
profits tax and substituted a corporation income tax on firms earning mere
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than $25»000. The Fair Labor Standards Aet was also passed in 1938* It
established a maximum work week of 44 hours and a minimum wage of an
hour. The new Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 instituted the policy
of assisting agriculture through voluntary acreage control and Commodity
Credit Corporation price support. Loans and marketing quotas were provided
for surplus crops.
All these laws were aimed at giving the economy, especially faxmers and
workers, more effective demand. Thus, with the evolution of a new anti¬
depression policy the Roosevelt Administration made a new concerted effort
to achieve recovery.
V. Results of Fiscal Policy
The New Deal Administration did not, in any year, balance the budget as
Roosevelt promised in 1932. As public spending increased, deficit occurred,
and public debt rose steadily. In 1933 vdien government receipts were $2.1
billion, expenditure was $5.1 billion. Thus there was a deficit of $3 bil¬
lion. Public debt was $22.5 billion in 1933 as against $19.5 billion in
1932. In 1939 vdien receipts totalled $5.2 billion, expenditure was $8.7
billion, deficit was $3.5 billion, and public debt rose to $40.4 billion
(see Table 7).
Against the increases in expenditure and public debt was the increase in
national income. As Table 7 shows, national income, at 1929 prices, increased
steadily from $56.7 billion in 1933 to $80.8 billion in 1937. In 1938 it de¬
clined somewhat to $79 billion, but rose again to $85.6 billion in 1939.
Given these figures, one could probably agree with President Roosevelt
when he said, in his 1940 budget message to Congress, '*l/llhen the increase in
the national debt is viewed against the background of what was accomplished
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by the growth of ••• effective national earning power ••• there is no
economic ground for anxiety* so far as the national debt is concerned* as
to the Nation's future."'
TABLE 7
PUBLIC DEBT* NATIONAL INCOME
AND UNEMPLOYMENT* 1933-1939




1933 $22.5 billion $56.7 billion 12*6 million
1934 27.0 62.1 10.9
1935 28.7 65*6 10*2
1936 33*5 75.0 8*6
1937 36*4 80.8 7*3
1938 37.1 79.0. 9.9
1939 40*4 85*6® 8.8
a
Measured at 1929 prices*
b
Computed from the figure of Dept* of Commerce*
Sources) (1) Public Debt) Statistical Abstract of the U. S.. 1942,
p* 237*
(2) National Incomes Kuznets* National Income and Its Composition.
1919-1938 (New Yorks National Bureau of Economic Research* 194l), voi.
p. 269, table 37.
(3) Unenqsleyment s Estimates of U. S. Dept, of Labor* Bureau of
Labor Statistics* 1945*
But when we look at unem|>loyment figures in Table 7* it bee(»nes imme¬
diately clear that the spending program did not solve the problem of unem¬
ployment* In 1933 there were 12*6 million people unenployed. In 1937 the
figure was reduced to 7*3 million* but in 1938 it rose to 9*9 million and
in 1939 it was still at 8.8 million*
1
Roosevelt* op. cit.. vol. DC, p. 24*
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The explanation Is obviousi the spending program failed to stimulate
private enterprise to increase investment adequately in order to absorb the
unemployed. In fact, there was disinvestment in private enterprise which
offset part of the effect of the spending program.
TABLE 8
NATIONAL INCOME, CAPITAL FORMATION,
AND PERSOJJAL SAVINGS, 1919-1938









1919-23 60.7 6.1 10.0 4.0
1924-28 77.1 7,7 9.9 3.7
1929-33 69.7 0.8 -0.3 4.3
1934-38 72.5 2.4 2.8 4.7
1918-28 68.9 6.9 10.0 3.9
1929-38 71.1 1.6 1.3 4.5
a
Measured ;at current prices.
Source: S. Kuznets, National Income and Its Composition . 1919-1938
(New York: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1941), vol. I, p.
269, Table 37 and p, 276, Table 39.
It can be seen from Table 8 that capital formation was much less in the 1930's
than in the 1920's. Even though average national income increased from $68.9
billion in 1918-28 to $71.1 billion in 1929-38, average capital formation de¬
clined from $6.9 billion in 1918-28 to $1.6 billion in 1929-38, The ratio
of capital formation to national income declined from 10^ in 1918-28 to 1.3^
in 1929-38. This represented a considerable volume of disinvestment which
offset part of the effect of public expenditure on national income and employ¬
ment.
But how could national income increase while capital formation greatly de¬
clined? There is only one possible explanation. In the 1920's, private enterprises
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had over-expanded their capacities in expectation of continuing prosperity.
Qfiee the depression set in, businessmen had to contract their output and
let part of their equipment lie idle. Later when government expenditure
increased, private enterprise was able to increase production without pro¬
portionate increase in employment and equipment, because of the existing
1
excess capacities.
Another factor vdiich accounted for the decline in private investment
in the 1930*8 was the increased personal savings during that period. Column
(4) of Table 8 shows us that average personal savings, at current prices, in¬
creased from $3.9 billion in 1918-28 to $4.5 billion in 1929-38, an increase
of 15.4^. But national income, at 1929 prices, increased from $68.9 billion
in 1918-28 to $71.1 billion in 1929-38, an increase of 3.2^ only. The in¬
crease in personal savings must be greater than 15.4^ when they were measured
at 1929 prices, since the average price level of the 1930*s was much lower
than that of the 1920's.
The fact that personal savings increased in the 1930's more than pro¬
portionately to the increase in national income indicated that pec^le's pro¬
pensity to consume was much lower in the 1930's than in the 1920*s. This,
of course, was due to the prevalent pessimistic outlook which made people
more cautious in spending. Thus the proposition which we made in chapter V
that the secondary and tertiary spending vdiich should follow government ex¬
penditure was likely to be small in a depression, was justified.
In short, because of excess capacities and low propensity to consume in
the 1930*s, businessmen were not willing to make new investments. Public
r '
B. F. Haley, "The Federal Budgett Economic Consequences of Deficit
Financing," American Economic Review. Feb.. 1941, p. 71.
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expenditure of the New Deal Administration was not adequate to lift the
consumer's purchasing power up to the point where increased demand would
1
make new investment unavoidable* Keynes was right in attributing the
failure Cf the spending program to achieve full employment to the "gigantic
power of production" of a modem industrial economy. He concluded that*
an unprecedented output has to be reached before a state of full
employment can be approadied.... The conclusion is that at all
recent times investment (and public) expenditure has been on a
scale vdiich was hopelessly inadequate to the problem. It ap**
pears to be politically inqsossible for a capitalistic democracy
to organize expenditure on the scale necessary to make the grand «
experiment idiidi would prove my case.*, except in war conditions*
Had there not been adverse psychological factors, however, private enter*
prise might have responded to public expenditure and increased their invest¬
ment instead of disinvesting. Investments are made on the basis of favorable
long-tezn expectations. The government spending program must have affected
favorably short-tezm expectations of businessmen, at least as long as the
program was continued* But since public spending was, from the very beginning,
regarded by the Administration as tenporary, there was no reason for business-
3
men to diange their long-tezm expectations favorably* Also, the inconsis¬
tency of some New Deal policies, as was shown, for example, in taxation
policy, the uncertainty of the international situation due to the threat ef
a new world war, and the lack of ^portunities for investment in new indus¬
tries, all contributed to make businessmen unwilling to tie up funds in long¬
term investments* It was because of all these factors that the fiscal policy
of the New Deal failed to achieve the results expected of it*
-
Colm, "Public Spending and Recovery in the U. S., " op. cit.. p. 135*
2
J. M. Keynes, "The United States and the Keynes Plan," New Republic




VI. The End of the New Deal
These adverse psychological factors disappeared almost immediately
when World War II broke out in September, 1939. Businessmen, convinced of
the supreme necessity of the defense program, were now willing to launch
new Investment projects for war production regardless of the future uncer¬
tainty. Also, war orders were increasingly pouring in from abroad, and the
United States soon became the "arsenal of democracy." The war "reduced un-
errqployment from 9,000,000 to a few hundred thousand and put halt and maimed,
1
old and young, in Jobs," National income, at current prices, rose from
$72.5 billion in 1939 to a high level of $183.8 billion in 1944 and $182.7
2
billion in 1945. Thus the war experience semns to have proved Keynes's
theory on which the fiscal policy of the New Deal was based.
At the outbreak of war the main policies of the New Deal Administration
were modified* All its measures were not abandoned. There was a shift of
enphasis to defense, with other objectives subordinated or incidental to it.
The United States, emerging from the Great Depression, was to meet the test
of a greater crisis.
1
Mitchell, opjCit., p. 319.
2
Dept, of Commerce, Survey of Current Business. July, 1947, Supplement,
p. 19, and July, 1949, p. 10.
CHAPTER VII
SUMMARY OF ANALYSIS OF FISCAL POLICY
!• Pump Priming
The fiscal policy of the New Deal Administration was to increase purchas¬
ing power of the economy by deficit spending* The spending program was di¬
vided into two stagest punqa priming and compensatory spending* In the period
of pump priming (1933-37), public expenditure was regarded as an expediency*
It was believed that deficit spending would stimulate private entezprise and
increase national income* Private enterprise would gain a momentum of its
own, then government spending could be tapered off*
The argument was largely Keynesian* Keynes said that tdien government
spending was financed by borrowed money, additional government spending would
give rise to secondary and tertiary spending and would have a "multiplier
effect" on national income* But some economists argued that deficit spending
might impair business confidence and bring about a pessimistic outlook*
Therefore, its effect on national income might not be as great as Keynes
thought it would be* It is in^ortant to know that for effective use of the
idea the economy must be responsive*
In the early years of the New Deal, the Administration was preocciipied
with monetary policy* It was only after 1935 that puiq} priming became the
dominant anti-depression policy of the New Deal*
A public works program was inportant in the period of punp priming* It
was started in 1933 with the establishment of the Public Works Administration*
In 1935 the Works Progress Administration was created* Within six years, it
gave employment to more than 8 million persons, when the expenditure was
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$11*4 billion. The Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) was also ioiportant in
bringing about recovery.
In 1937 the economy showed substantial improvements. National incomei
at 1929 priceSf increased from $56.7 billion in 1933 to $80.8 billion in
1937. The automobile industry was greatly stimulated. Its production in¬
creased from 99 in 1935 to 121 in 1937.
Because of the inprowements in business in 1937, government expenditure
was cut from $8.9 billion in 1936 to $7.3 billion in 1938. But a recession
quickly set in. Automobile production fell from 121 in 1937 to 63 in 1938.
Unenployment rose from 7.3 million in 1937 to 9.9 million in 1938. Thus the
pump priming program failed because private enterprise did not gain a momentum
of its own and government spending could not be tapered off without creating
a recession.
The improvements in business up to 1937 were due to increased consumption
made possible by installment credit expansion and government expenditure. In
1937 both installment credit and government spending were reduced. Conse¬
quently consumption fell off and production declined. In order to get out of
the recession, therefore, the government had to resume its spending. Thus in
1938, the New Deal entered the second stage of its spending programs conpen-
satory spending.
II. Conpensatory Spending
After the recession of 1937, it was realized that private enterprise it¬
self could not provide full employment. Public investment must supplement,
or coDpensate for deficiency in, private investment. Deficit spending was
deliberately undertaken to achieve recovery. From 1938 to 1940, federal
government expenditure totalled about $25 billion. Public debt increased
68
from $36,4 billion in 1937 to $43 billion in 1940.
This change of attitude was due to the influence of Keynes after the
publication of the General Theory of Emplcyment. Interest and Money in 1936.
The main relevant ideas of the General Theory are* (l) there is a tendency
towards over*8aving because as people's incomes rise, an increasing part ef
the imcomes is saved; (2) there is a tendency towards undeir-investment be¬
cause of diminishing "marginal efficiency of capital" and "liquidity prefer¬
ence i" (3) the wider the gap between saving and investment, the larger are
the deficiencies of effective demand and unerqployment; (4) in order to achieve
full employment, therefore, it is necessary for government to reduce interest
rates and, more inportant still, to increase public spending financed by bor¬
rowed money, or tax revenue from idle savings.
Keynes also advocated tax reduction in order to increase purchasing power*
This, however, was not adopted by the Administration. Instead, the Adminis¬
tration increased tax rates and introduced several new taxes. The increased
taxation offset part of the effect of government spending.
Reduction in the rates of different types of taxes have different effects
on purchasing power* However, deficit spending is likely to be more effective
than a tax reduction in creating purchasing power. There are two reasonst (1)
a reduction in a sales tax or payroll tax may result not in lower prices, but
in increased profits; (2) a reduction in personal and corporation income taxes
will generally lead to increased savings, vdiile the government can spend as
much as it borrows. But it is important that government borrowing should not
replace private borrowing* The most desirable policy is to combine deficit
spending with an appropriate tax reduction.
The consequences of compensatory spending were an increased national
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income and a new development in other fields of the New Deal program.
National income, at 1929 prices, increased from $79 billion in 1938 to $87
billion in 1939. Public debt increased from $37 billion in 1938 to $40 bil¬
lion in 1939.
The new anti-trust program, headed by Thuitnan Arnold, was revived with
a new vigor. Changes were also made in taxation, labor, agricultural and
social security policies. The Revenue Act of 1938, the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938, and the new Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1938 were all passed
to increase effective demand.
III. Results of Fiscal Policy
The Administration did not balance the budget. Public debt increased
from $22.5 billion in 1933 to $40.4 billion in 1939. National income, at
1929 prices, increased from $56.7 billion in 1933 to $85.6 billion in 1939.
There was no doubt that the government’s spending program contributed most
to the increase in national income.
But the spending program did not solve the problem of unenployment. In
1939 there were still 8.8 million persons unenqoloyed. The explanation is
that private investment declined in the 1930's and offset part of the effect
of deficit spending on national income and employment. In 1918-28 vdien the
average national income was $68.9 billion, average capital formation was $6.9
billion. In 1929-38 national income increased to $71.1 billion, but capital
formation declined to $1.6 billion.
In the 1920*s, private enterprise had over-expanded their capacities.
This led to excess capacities in the 1930's when the depression set in. Also,
in the 1930's, general propensity to consume was low because of high personal
savings. These two factors brought about the decline in private investment
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in the 1930's and the failure of the New Deal program to achieve full em¬
ployment.
But adverse psychological factors also played an important role. Invest¬
ments are made only when there are favorable long-term expectations. Public
spending was regarded by the Administration as temporary. The Administration
was also inconsistent in some of its policies* such as taxation. Consequently
businessmen were not willing to make sufficient new investments.
World War II broke out in September* 1939. Businessmen were now willing
to make new investments because they knew defense spending would increase
for a long time. It was only then that the problem of uneopleyment was
solved and the economy was lifted out of the depression.
CHAPTER VIII
THE EXPERIENCE OF THE 1930'S AND THE FUTURE
I* Easy Money and Deficit Spending
One of the experiences of the New Deal Administration was that dieap or
easy money was not adequate then, to induce a substantial increase in in¬
vestment, output, and employment* Deficit spending was mudi more effective
as an anti-depression measure.
The loss of faith in monetary and credit policy as a major means of re¬
covery, however, did not lead to the abandonment of easy money policy* We
have seen in diapter III that there was a large flew of gold into the country
after the devaluation of the gold dollar in 1934* Consequently the excess
reserves of the member banks were greatly increased* The large accumulations
of excess reserves, accompanied by declining opportunities for investment, in¬
duced the banks to reduce the rate of Interest in order to find otJtlets for
loan Investments*
At the same time the Administration was engaged in deficit spending* As
public debt increased steadily and there appeared to be no possibility of re¬
ducing it without risk of recession, it was desirable for the Administration
to keep the cost of borrowing as low as possible* Thus because of the accu¬
mulations of excess reserves and the need of deficit financing, monetary
policy became subordinated to fiscal policy*
In 1933 all member banks held $6*9 billion of government securities* In
1939 the holdings increased to $13*8 billion* The average interest rate on
the whole public debt was 3 3/4^ at the end of 1930; at the end of 1934 it was
2S(>i and it continued to fall to 2 ^2 5/89^ at the end of 1938*
The subordinate role which monetary policy played to fiscal policy was
made more apparent vihen, in 1937, the Federal Qaen Market Committee announced
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its readiness to make open market purchases of United States Caovernment
securities in order to maintain "orderly conditions" in the Government se¬
curities market. This object was important to the Reserve System as well as
to the Treasury, because (1) the Government bond market had become an im¬
portant segment of the money market, (2) bonds became important as bank in-
1
vestments and the prices of long-texn bonds tend to fluctuate more widely*
Consequently the function of the Reserve System became more and more that of
preserving stability in the government bond market and less and less that of
2
exercising monetary control*
The large holdings of government securities by banks gave rise to another
problem. Hansen suggested that when business activities increased, banks
would sell government securities in order to provide bank credit* Bond prices
would fall, the interest rate would rise* This would make the financing of
further expansion increasingly difficult* Hansen concluded, therefore, thatt
A vast governmental deficit financed by a banking system renders it
peculiarly difficult for private investment to expand in the amount
required for full employment.*.. Deficit financing through long-texm
bonds, in so far as such bonds are held by the banks, imposes a limit 3
on the expansion of private investment beyond a fairly moderate amount*
Hansen's pessimism is not fully Justified. In the first place, as Hardy
said, a decline in the price of high-grade securities and a rise in interest
1
C. J. Anderson, "Quest for Stability," The Quest for Stability (Philadel
phia* Federal Reserve Bank of Fhiladelphia, 1950), p. 18.
2
J* H. Williams, "The Implication ef Fiscal Policy for Monetary Policy
and the Banking System," American Economic Review. Supplement. March, 1942,
p. 246.
3
A. Hansen, op. cit.. p. 272.
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rates are to be expected in the course of recovery* “If recovery cannot
take place in the face of some decline in the prices that investors will
pay for safe Investments during a severe depression*clearly there never
can be recovery under the operation of the motivations that are character-
1
istic of a system of private enterprise*"
Secondly, if instead of holding government securities, the banks held
consumer paper or made call loans, the situation would be similar* Vtien
the demand for loans expanded, the banks would withdraw from the stock
market, in order to accommodate business* The disturbance of the stock
2
market would make further financing more difficult*
Therefore, a rising rate of interest is inevitable in the course of re*
covery, ahether banks had large holdings of government securities or not*
There are only two ways outt (1) banks must deliberately hold sufficient
excess reserves in a depression for financing expansion in a recovery. But
this is in^ractical since, even in a depression, banks will seek profitable
outlets for their resources; (2) the Federal Reserve System must share the
responsibility of financing expansion in the recovery* This is to pursue
an easy money policy in a recovery as well as in a depression* This seems
to be the only feasible way to avoid choking off an expansion in the coxn-se
of a recovery*
The conclusion is that a low rate of interest is desirable both in a de¬
pression and in a recovery* In the former it keeps the cost of private in¬
vestment and government deficit spending low* In the latter it makes continued
_
C* 0* Hardy, "An Appraisal of the Factors which Stopped short the Recovery






II. Consistency ef Fiscal Policy
Vite have seen that some measures of the fiscal ef the New Deal were in¬
consistent and worked at cross purposes. The best example was the increased
taxation whidi diminished purchasing power and offset the imcome-increasing
expenditure.
In the future, it is important that taxation policy should be in harmony
with spending policy. In periods of boom and prosperity, government should
reduce its expenditure* Taxation can be increased to avoid inflation. But
in periods of recession and depression, government should increase its ex¬
penditure and reduce its taxation. The only tax that can logically be in¬
creased in a depression is a tax on idle savings.
Another example of inconsistency was that «4ien the federal government
increased its expenditure, some state and local governments actually reduced
their expenditures because of diminished tax revenue. This, no doubt, offset
part of the effect of the deficit spending Of the federal government. In the
future, the fiscal policy of the federal government must take into account,
and must be co-ordinated with, the fiscal policies of state, and local govern¬
ment.
Two methods have been suggested to co-ordinate the policies of federal,
state, and local governmentst




American Econcxnic Association, "Discussion on co-ordination of federal,
state, and local fiscal system," American Economic Beview. Proceedings.
March, 1942, p. 214*
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The second is the suggestion that the state assume the role of agency
1
for the federal government.
III. Co-ordination of Different Policies
Another experience of the 1930's was that v^lle fiscal policy was more
effective than monetary policy in combating a depression, fiscal policy
alone was not sufficient to bring about recovery. Fiscal policy can be ef¬
fective only when it is reinforced by other policies. Therefore, it is im¬
portant that fiscal and non-fiscal policies be well co-ordinated so that they
complement one another and do not work at cross purposes. Several measures
can be recommended to be co-ordinated with fiscal policy, to achieve maximum
effectiveness.
1. Public Assurance
One of the reasons why the deficit spending of the New Deal failed to
achieve full employment was the lack of confidence of businessmen in the
govenvnent. They did not feel certain that the government would continue
the recovery policy of sustaining purchasing power. Therefore they were un¬
willing to tie up funds in long-term investments. This indicates that the
effectiveness of fiscal policy depends largely on the response of the people
and the prevailing economic attitude of the society. To have the confidence
of the people, the government must, first of all, assure them that its policy
would be consistently pursued as long as maladjustments existed. Secondly,
the government must educate the people, so that they may understand policy





The process of changing a tax law or expenditure program usually takes
the Congress months of hearings and debate. This naturally reduces the ef¬
fectiveness of fiscal policy. To overcome this difficulty, the device of
advance enactment was proposed by the American Economic Association in a ccm-
mittee report. The Association recommended advance enactment by Congress ef
statutes providing for changes in taxes, transfer payments, or public works
expenditure, and setting forth rules or standards for putting these changes
1
into effect* For exanple, a law could provide, for a specific program of
public works to be put into operation in accordance with changes in standard
2
indices of production and employment.
3* Compensatory Wage and Employment Policy
Even when other measures fail and maladjustments occur, it is still de¬
sirable to use whatever means we have to reduce unenployment. Two measures
have been proposed by Clark to increase purchasing power on the one hand,
and increase employment on the other hands
The first is to increase wages, in order to increase purchasing power*
3
"Wages should be as hig^ as possible without actually reducing employment"
The second is to reduce working hours so as to spread work. "Instead of
the same number of workers making increased weekly earnings, a larger number
4
make the same weekly earnings as before."
1
American Economic Association Committee Report, The Problem of Economic
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Co-operation between the Executive and the Legislature
One of the defects of the recovery policies in the 1930's was that they
were regarded almost wholly as the responsibility of the executive and were
1
at best tolerated by the legislature* This reduced the effectiveness of
fiscal policy as there wras no guarantee that the policy would continue to
be tolerated by the legislature* But if the legislature and the executive
share in the responsibility of policy-making, then it can be expected that
the policy will be consistently pursued*
Finally, economic stability and full employment is too great a task to
be achieved by any single policy* The experience of the 1930's proved this
beyond doubt* In the future, we must use all appropriate measures at our
disposal to reach that goal* "The most powerful weapon in the economic
2
arsenal of democrary is coordination of a great variety of policy devices."
1
G, Colm, "Fiscal Policy and the Federal Budget," op. cit*. p* 217
2
Budget Director Harold D. Smith, in his testimony on the Full Enployment
Bill before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on Banking and Currency
Hearings, 79th Congress, 1st Session, August 30, 1945*
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